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The Golden Dawn isn’t a story that began last year. The “men and women in the black shirts” 
were always near you, they lived among you, for many years. Some of you wouldn’t take 
them seriously, some of you were comforted in your bourgeois dream, but we said that our 
time would come, our age still hasn’t begun, because we aren’t the quiet birds of peacetime, 
we are birds of the storm and the hurricane. The storm came and the hurricane came and with 
them we came – we, the “men and women in the black shirts”. In these pages, you will read 
part of our story… 
 – Golden Dawn International Newsroom, 2014. 
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Loans make people slaves. 
– Menander, Greek philosopher, 341/2–290 B.C. 
 
 
 
[T]he pessimism of indignation […] Here the claim is made to judge history, to divest it of its 
fatality, to discover responsibility behind it, guilty men in it. For this is the rub, one needs 
guilty men. The underprivileged, the decadents of all kinds […] need victims […] To this end, 
they need an appearance of justice, […] some sort of scapegoat. This scapegoat can be God 
[…] or the social order, or education and training, or the Jews, or the nobility, or those who 
have turned out well in any way. In short, the pessimism of indignation invents responsibility 
in order to create a pleasant feeling for itself – revenge – ‘Sweeter than honey’ old Homer 
called it. 
– Friedrich Nietzche, The Will to Power, New York: Vintage, 1967:201–2. 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the rise of the extreme right party Golden Dawn in Greece. The 
main argument is that it is necessary to understand the developments of the modern 
Greek state, from independence and throughout the financial crisis, to understand that 
there is a general tendency in Greece to lean towards the far right in times of crisis. 
Recent developments in Greece should therefore not be seen as a unique phenomenon, 
but rather as a confirmation of the importance of nationalism, the effects of populism, 
and also the heritage of fascism in contemporary Greece. The first part of this thesis 
therefore looks at the history of Greece from 1821 to 1990 before moving on to a 
larger discussion on developments from the 1990s. Particular attention will be given 
to the period from the financial crisis of 2008 up until this day (early May 2014). 
 
This thesis also looks at the concepts of nationalism, fascism and populism, and how 
they are crucial both in defining the concept of the extreme right and for 
understanding extreme right-wing parties.  
  
 
Key words: fascism, Golden Dawn, Greece, nationalism, populism, right-wing 
extremism, the extreme right, the far right, the financial crisis. 
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  1 Introduction 
 
This thesis looks at the rise of the extreme right-wing party People’s Association – 
Golden Dawn (Greek: Λαϊκός Σύνδεσµος – Χρυσή Αυγή, XA1) in Greece. Towards 
the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Europe was struck by a financial crisis. 
In many countries the crisis led to social riots, instability and a sudden rise in mistrust 
of government and leading politicians. Even if it is the cradle of democracy, modern-
day Greece has a long history of both authoritarian dictatorship and corruption. In the 
years since the crisis struck there has been an increase in discrimination and street 
violence, as well as a visibly larger support for parties at the far right of the political 
spectrum. The increase in racially motivated violence in the wake of a financial crisis 
can be seen in other European countries as well, such as Hungary today and Germany 
in the early 20th century. Even so, few have yet to look at the direct link between 
economic decline and the rise of extreme right-wing movements.2 
 
Despite their more extreme neo-Nazi viewpoints, more people seem to think that XA 
provides an alternative to the other political parties. Nevertheless, the party’s 
involvement in criminal activities, violence and the murder of anti-fascist rapper and 
activist Pavlos Fyssas has led the Greek government to consider banning the party.3 
This led to a mass arrest of prominent Golden Dawn members, including the party 
leader Nikolaos ‘Nikos’ Michaloliakos in October 2013.4 As of May 2014, the party is 
still under investigation and Michaloliakos is still under arrest. Even so, XA has 
received support from members of other neo-Nazi parties in Europe, including 
                                            
1 I will be using Golden Dawn and the abbreviation XA interchangeably when referring to the 
Greek party. 
2 An exception is Alan de Bromhead, Barry Eichengreen & Kevin O’Rourke, ”Political Extremism 
in the 1920s and 1930s: Do German Lessons Generalize?”, Journal of Economic History, vol. 73, nr. 
2 (2012): 371-406. 
3 See for instance Helena Smith, “Greece moves to ban far-right Golden Dawn party”, The 
Guardian, 18.09.2013 
4 Helena Smith, “Golden Dawn leader Nikolaos Michaloliakos arrested”, The Guardian, 
28.09.2013 
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Svenskarnas parti in Sweden and Danskernes Parti in Denmark, as well as from the 
leader of the British National Party, Nick Griffin.5 Despite allegations of violence and 
criminal behaviour the party is surprisingly stable in the opinion polls, and in one of 
the latest polls from the beginning of April 2014, the party had 9.9 per cent.6 
 
Modern Greek history is built upon deep political cleavages, and the right side has 
dominated Greek politics for most of the 20th century. The scope of my thesis 
therefore stretches beyond just the time of Golden Dawn. The development in Greece 
is not, I dare say, a unique phenomenon. Rather I argue that one can trace this and 
similar events back in history. To understand recent developments I have therefore 
gone as far back as to 1821, the year when modern Greece gained independence from 
the Ottoman Empire. It is my belief that political culture combined with economic 
downturn is the best explanation for the rise of the far right in Greece. In that way the 
financial crisis may be seen solely as the precipitating cause for the recent political 
developments in Greece. Even so, other possibly contributing factors, such as 
increased European integration through membership in the EU, and also factors 
directly related to Golden Dawn like ideology, rhetoric and the motivation of their 
voters, will also be accounted for. 
 
At the time of writing, the financial crisis has to some extent been declared over, with 
the re-entrance of Greece on the international stock market in early April 2014. 
However, the aftermath of the crisis is yet to be seen, and the effects are yet to be 
analysed. The intention of this study is not to provide solutions, yet I hope it can 
provide some insights and, at best, some explanations for the rise of support for the 
extreme right in Greece. 
 
 
                                            
5 See for instance Expo, ‘Svenska nynazister i protester med Gyllene gryning’, Expo, 04.02.2014; 
Danskernes parti, ‘Danskernes Parti besøgte Gyldent Daggry’, 05.02.2014. 
6 Opinion poll done by MRB for real.gr, 14.04.2014, 
www.3comma14.gr/pi/view_survey.php?id=21469 [23.04.2014]. 
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Research question 
When I decided to write my thesis on the rise of Golden Dawn, I did so with the 
presumption that the financial crisis was the main contributing factor to the party’s 
increased support. My tentative research question was therefore the following: 
 
What can explain the rise of the extreme right-wing party Golden Dawn in Greece? 
 
Despite this, I knew that I had to take other factors into account before drawing such 
an inference, and there was also a question of how big of a factor the financial crisis 
actually was? To find an answer I would have to include other explanatory variables. 
When looking into other factors beside the financial crisis that could explain the 
increase in support of Golden Dawn the past years, I soon realised that the research 
question was unfathomable. I would have to narrow it down, lest it become too big a 
task for the limited time, and space, that I had been given. I therefore identified three 
factors, or explanatory variables, to look into. As a result I ended up with the 
following research question: 
 
In light of the recent financial crisis, how do modern Greek history and political 
tradition, party ideology, and European integration through membership in the 
European Union affect the rise of the extreme right party Golden Dawn? 
 
Though still unfathomable, it is now narrowed down to the three main factors that I 
presume are most important, namely history and political traditions, party ideology, 
and lastly, the effects of European integration through the European Union and 
membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
 
 
 
 
4 
  
 
Background 
 
A short introduction to the history of Greece, 1821–2014  
The modern history of Greece usually starts with the Greek War of Independence that 
lasted from 1821 to 1829, including the recognition of Greece as an independent 
nation in 1823. The period following the 1820s was highly unstable and also saw the 
creation of a Greek identity that had been almost non-existent prior to the 
independence. Nationalism grew strong and there was a wish to find a link between 
ancient and modern Greece, emphasising the time of Alexander the Great. 
 
After a period shifting between monarchy and republic, the Second Hellenic Republic 
was proclaimed in 1924 as an attempt to restore stability. In the period that followed 
Greece experienced a series of failed coups and small wars until, once again, 
monarchy was restored as the Kingdom of Greece under George II in 1935. Less than 
a year later, in August 1936, General Ioannis Metaxas staged a coup and declared 
martial law. This was the start of a period of right-wing dictatorship that lasted until 
Nazi-Germany’s invasion in 1941. Once more the nation was thrown into instability, 
and the end of the Second World War was followed by a civil war between the 
government and the communists of the Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELAS) that 
lasted from 1947 to 1951. 
 
The period after 1951 was characterised by American influence. The Western allies 
were terrified of losing control over Greece because of her strategic position during 
the Cold War and therefore helped prop up a weak state structure. This lasted until the 
famous colonels’ coup of 1967. This was the start of a military dictatorship that lasted 
until the Third Hellenic Republic was established in 1974. 
 
After 1974, a two-party system dominated by the centre-right party New Democracy 
(ND) and the social-democratic Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) influenced 
5 
  
Greek politics. After the fall of the colonels’ regime, the far right played a minor role 
in Greek politics until the establishment of the populist party LAOS (Popular 
Orthodox Rally) in 2000. LAOS represented a new generation within Greek politics 
and was an alternative even further to the right for those who were not happy with the 
majority rule of ND and PASOK. The period also saw the establishment of Golden 
Dawn. 
 
Golden Dawn and the situation in Greece today 
Its current leader, Nikos Michaloliakos, founded Golden Dawn in 1980. Starting off as 
a magazine, the party increased its involvement in politics from the beginning of the 
1990s.7 In the elections of 2009 Golden Dawn obtained 0.29 per cent of the vote, i.e., 
less than 20,000 people voted for them. In the election in May 2012, however, they 
had suddenly grown to 6.97 per cent, or 441,018 votes, a development that caused 
some alarm in the media.8 
 
Both Human Rights Watch (2012) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (2013) have 
reported an increase in xenophobic or racially motivated violence in Greece.9 Along 
the same lines, Alexandra Koronaiou and Alexandros Sakellariou refer to the ‘urban 
myths’ about XA helping the general population with the difficulties they face in 
everyday activities.10 Koronaiou and Sakellariou also refer to the establishment of a 
Greek blood bank, as one of XA’s first initiatives after the election in 2012: 
 
                                            
7 John S. Koliopoulos & Thanos M. Veremis, Modern Greece. A History since 1821, Malden, MA, 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. 
8 Antonis A. Ellinas, ‘The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece’, in 
South European Society and Politics, vol. 18, no. 4 (2013); See also William Wheeler, ‘Europe´s New 
Fascists’, The New York Times, 17.11.2012; Rachel Donadio & Dimitris Bounias, ‘Hard Times Lift 
Greece’s Anti-Immigrant Fringe’, The New York Times, 12.04.2012; Associated Press, ‘Golden 
Dawn: leader of far-right party lashes out at Greece's “traitors”’, The Guardian, 06.05.2012. 
9 See HRW, Hate on the streets: Xenophobic violence in Greece, Human Rights Watch, 2012; See 
also Flyktninghjelpen [Norwegian Refugee Council, Flyktningregnskapet. Alt om mennesker på flykt 
verden over, Flyktninghjelpen, 2013. 
10 Alexandra Koronaiou & Alexandros Sakellariou, ‘Reflections on “Golden Dawn”, community 
organizing and nationalist solidarity: helping (only) Greeks’, in Community Development Journal, 
vol. 48, no. 2(2013). 
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This took place at the end of June 2012, and the initiative was taken by the ‘Green (i.e. 
ecological) Wing’ of the organization. The ﬁrst announcement ends with the phrase: ‘Donate 
blood – Save a Greek Soul’, while in another poster we read: ‘Blood bank and bank for 
platelets, only for Greeks, who need our help’, with the phrase ‘only for Greeks’ being 
underlined with the blue national colour.11 
 
This illustrates how the XA define Greeks through blood and underlines their idea of 
the importance of keeping the Greek blood pure. The blood bank can be seen as a 
response to the massive inflow of immigrants the past decades, thereby creating a 
feeling of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’, where providing health care and employment for ‘them’ 
(the immigrants) creates a problem for ‘us’ (the Greeks), or puts ‘us’ at the back of the 
line.12 Playing on this, XA ‘[…] present themselves as the substitute for an inadequate 
welfare state and the only political party that cares for the Greek people and its 
communal needs’.13 Arguably, this is a clear parallel to the rise of NSDAP in 
Germany between 1929 and 1933. 
 
Unlike many other political parties in Greece, the Golden Dawn is at once both a 
movement and a party, and I will therefore refer to it as both. Even so, to support 
Golden Dawn is not the same as to vote for it. In that way, electoral results might give 
an idea of the electoral basis of the party, but not of how many will actually take to the 
streets in support of the movement. I therefore believe that it can at times be useful to 
distinguish between the two. I will get back to this in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Methodology 
My presumption is that the recent financial crisis is the main reason for the increase in 
support for the right-wing extremists in Greece. Through a study of Greek history in 
the 20th and 21st centuries I wish to answer why the extreme right have seen an 
increase of support in the recent years of the financial crisis, and to see whether this is 
                                            
11 ibid., 333. 
12 For more on ‘us vs. them’ see Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and nationalism, 
Anthropological Perspectives, London/New York: Pluto Press, 2010. 
13 Koronaiou & Sakellariou 2013:334. 
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a general tendency based on historical tradition or a new development. As a result, my 
approach will be both descriptive and analytical, and I will have to rely heavily on 
secondary sources. 
 
A historian’s perspective 
This thesis is written as a part of the history track of Peace and Conflict Studies at the 
University of Oslo. History in the 21st century has for a long time been greatly 
influenced by political science theories and also, though some may disagree, vice 
versa. Not unlike how a political scientist may see how an event fits a selected theory, 
the historian’s role is to see how specific events may differ from what is expected. In 
my opinion, one can look at history in linear terms, as a long line that stretches from 
the past to the present. The role of the historian is to highlight or explain the events 
that differ from the expected linear ‘path’. Examples of such ‘irregularities’ are major 
events or particular people of major importance that all in their own way have 
participated to the creation of history, be it Alexander the Great, the French revolution 
or the Second World War. This thesis can therefore to some extent be called cross-
disciplinary. Even so, though I am greatly inspired by political science theory, I am 
first and foremost a historian. The same goes for this thesis. 
 
In contrast to the idea that the great events and great men create history, some have 
claimed that it is the historians themselves that create it. According to Martha Howell 
and Walter Prevenier ‘… historians do not discover a past as much as they create it; 
they choose the events and people they think constitute the past, and they decide what 
about them is important to know’.14 In that way, one could say that history does not 
exist until it is written. This leads to the question of the biasedness of the historian. A 
historian should always strive to be objective in her interpretation, but like all other 
researchers she may be influenced by the time of writing as well as by distance in time 
and geography. In other words, one needs to understand both the time under study as 
well as the time of the historian to understand how it may affect the interpretation, and 
                                            
14 Martha Howell & Walter Prevenier, From Reliable Sources. An Introduction to Historical 
Methods, Ithaca/London:Cornell University Press, 2001:1. 
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so a historian should always seek to describe history wie es eigentlich gewesen ist, or 
as it really was.15 
 
Research design 
My research design will take the form of a typical single-case study. According to 
John Gerring a ‘case study may be understood as the intensive study of a single case 
where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of 
cases (a population)’.16 I have chosen to do a single case study, focusing only on 
Greece, as opposed to a comparative study involving one or several other countries. 
This is first and foremost because I believe that the visibly increased support for an 
extreme right party such as Golden Dawn, over a period of just a few years, is 
interesting enough in itself to be worthy of a proper study, but also, arguably, because 
in-depth knowledge of a single case can be better than fleeting knowledge of a 
number of cases, since this can provide better grounds for generalisation at a later 
stage. 
 
My research question implies a causal relationship between both historical and more 
recent developments in Greece and the rise of the extreme right. Describing and 
identifying such a causal relationship requires a study of the processes behind it. Jack 
Goldstone has emphasised the role of process tracing in explaining macro-historical 
phenomena:  
 
To identify the process, one must perform the difficult cognitive feat of figuring out which 
aspects of the initial conditions observed, in conjunction with which simple principles of the 
many that may be at work, would have combined to generate the observed sequence of 
events.17 
                                            
15 See Leopold von Ranke, ‘Preface: Histories of the Latin and Germanic Nations from 1494-
1514’, in Fritz Stern (ed.) The Varieties of History: From Voltaire to the Present, New York: Vintage 
Books, 1973:57. 
16 John Gerring, Case Study Research. Principles and Practices, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007:20. 
17 Alexander L. George & Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social 
sciences, Cambridge/London: Mass/MIT, 2005.  
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For the purpose of explaining my hypothesis, I will mainly make use of the method of 
process tracing for my analysis. In that way it may be more of an analytical 
explanation. This variety of process tracing ‘converts a historical narrative into an 
analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms’.18 A problem 
regarding this type of process tracing is that the explanation may be deliberately 
selective, and so only focus on aspects that are seen as particularly important. Process 
tracing and historical explanation are closely related methods, and this is a typical 
form of bias that may occur in historical explanation. 
 
Bias in historical explanation 
According to McCullagh, there are four common ways in which historical writing can 
be biased.19 However, all of these may occur accidentally in historical explanation and 
it should therefore not be called biased unless they occur because the historian wants 
the outcome she has produced. First, a historian might sometimes misinterpret 
evidence. Say you are writing about a significant event, claiming it occurred, when in 
fact you are choosing to ignore all the evidence stating otherwise. Second, being 
selective when choosing which sources or narratives to use may lead to an 
unbalanced, or even unfair, interpretation of the past. Such a one-sided interpretation 
may for instance highlight people’s virtues and ignore their vices. The third is when a 
description of the past implies facts that are known to be false. McCullagh uses the 
example of a Marxist that might describe a revolution as a class struggle, even though 
there were no classes involved. The fourth is when one provides a causal explanation 
of a historical event without mentioning all the important causes. The reader may then 
get a misleading impression of the process that led to the event. 
 
                                            
18 George & Bennett 2005:211, emphasis in original. 
19 C. Behan McCullagh, “Bias in historical description, interpretation, and explanation”, in History 
and Theory, vol. 39, no. 1(2000).  
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Challenges regarding the use of secondary literature 
Because of language barriers I will primarily make use of secondary sources, such as 
previous historical works on modern Greece, newspaper articles and academic papers. 
The phenomenon of right-wing extremism often comes in ‘waves’, and during and 
after these ‘waves’ there is an increase in the number of published articles and 
research projects. In other words, there are therefore periods with more information 
than others. There are also examples of some parties or extreme right phenomena 
having been studied more than others. One of the reasons for this is language. As 
Müller-Rommel has noted: 
 
Studying small parties obviously encounters some unique problems especially when it comes 
to gathering information for a cross-national analysis. In most cases there are clearly language 
problems. Although it is relatively easy to collect information on party programmes, 
manifestos and party statutes, it is notably more difficult to read these brochures since (in 
most cases) they have not been translated to English or another international language.20 
 
Using secondary literature leads to questions of biasedness, since such literature has 
been interpreted by someone else and is not presented in a neutral way, but rather 
according to the wishes of the author. The best way of dealing with such bias is by 
using several different interpretations; here this pertains to different authors, and also 
different newspapers. The official website of the party is in Greek, I will therefore 
make use of the official website of XA Ameriki, the local branch of Golden Dawn in 
the United States, as well as the website known as the Golden Dawn International 
Newsroom. Keeping in mind that these websites have been created for a more 
international audience than the original, they still provide useful English translations 
of official documents. The availability of this type of information is important for 
analysing how XA define themselves to an external as well as an internal audience. 
After all, it is not my intention to solely present the Greek view, but rather try to look 
at recent developments in an outsider’s perspective. International newspaper articles 
                                            
20 Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, ‘Small parties in comparative perspective: the state of the art’, in 
Ferdinand Müller-Rommel and Geoffrey Pridham (eds.), Small Parties in Western Europe. 
Comparative and National Perspectives, London: Sage, 1991:2.
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are therefore essential in this regard. As for XA’s ideological positions, there are three 
main documents that present the ideology of XA. The first is the official ideological 
document Ιδεολογία (ideology), a pamphlet of about 16 pages that frequently quotes 
Michaloliakos. The second is a political programme, πολιτικές θέσεις (political 
positions). And the third is the Manifesto of Golden Dawn, also known as Ταυτότητα 
(identity).21 All can be found on the official website of Golden Dawn as well as the 
website of XA Ameriki and the International Newsroom, and the last can also be 
found in the appendix. It should also be noted that only the second and the last are 
available in English. 
 
There are a number of both Greek and international authors who have written about 
the history of modern Greece. For my own account of the years from 1821 to 2014 I 
will mainly make use of the works of David S. Close, Richard Clogg and of John S. 
Koliopulos and Thanos Veremis. These four authors are the most frequently cited 
when it comes to accounts of Greek history in the designated period. From the late 
2000s and up until today I will also make use of international newspaper articles as 
well as academic papers. Whilst I am aware that the media is rarely unbiased, I still 
believe that I have been able to analyse the available material as objectively as 
possible. Throughout my thesis, I have explicitly expressed my concerns whenever I 
have been in doubt of an interpretation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
21 The whole manifesto can be found in the appendix. The English translation has been proofread 
by Nina Biering Alexidis, with the note mentioned in footnote 229. 
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The following chapters 
In the next chapter I will provide a thorough discussion of theories on the rise of the 
extreme right, the purpose of which will be to create a theoretical framework for 
further analysis of Golden Dawn. I will then move on to the main part of the thesis, 
starting with Chapter 3, 1821–1949: Shaping Modern Greece. Here I will give a brief 
overview of the history of Greece since independence in 1821, especially focusing on 
political developments. Chapter 4 is a continuation of Chapter 3, now focusing on the 
years between 1949 and 1990. The main focus is still political developments, but 
particular attention will be given to foreign affairs, and especially European 
integration after the end of the civil war. In Chapter 5, 1990–2014: The Financial 
Crisis, I will look at more contemporary issues. I will here provide a thorough account 
of the developments in Greece during the financial crisis, again focusing on politics, 
but also on public response. Chapter 6, People’s Association – Golden Dawn, will 
briefly look at the history of Golden Dawn from its establishment and up until today. 
Specific attention will be paid to ideology, symbolism and organisation. Moving on to 
the last chapter in the main part of this thesis, Chapter 7, The Appeal of the Extreme 
Right, will sum up some of the arguments made in the previous chapters. I will also 
discuss how my case fits the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2. The thesis 
ends with a conclusion in Chapter 8. 
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2 Theoretical framework: Extremism 
from the margins to the mainstream 
 
Extreme right parties are commonly described as nationalist, populist, against the 
ruling system or against specific parties, and often, but not always, fascist.22 For 
something to be extreme, it needs to tip the scale as far away from the centre, and 
from what is considered ‘moderate’, as possible.23 It can therefore be seen as an 
anomaly. On the political scale one can slide and be extreme both to the left and to the 
right, the only resemblance being the distance from the ‘safe’ centre. For a party to be 
categorised as extreme right, it therefore needs to be as far to the right as possible. 
Nothing can exceed the extreme.  
 
The main theoretical framework is based on theories of the rise of the extreme right, 
supported by relevant concepts like fascism, nationalism and populism. If one is to 
fully understand a phenomenon, such a discussion may be useful for further 
categorisation of the phenomenon under study, in this case the role of XA and how the 
party fits the concepts that I have already mentioned. Categorisation helps isolate the 
phenomenon and makes it easier to determine what approach to use for further 
studies. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to create a framework for my later 
analysis on the rise of right-wing extremism in Greece, and of Golden Dawn in 
particular. It should be noted that opposed to the concepts of nationalism, populism 
and fascism, there are no commonly accepted definitions of the extreme right. 
 
Supporting concepts 
There is a vast amount of research done on the concepts of nationalism, fascism and 
populism, and it is not my intention to review it all. Instead I wish to give a brief 
                                            
22 Ian McLean & Alistair McMillan, Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2003:189. 
23 Uwe Backes, ‘Meaning and Forms of Political Extremism in Past and Present’, in Central 
European Political Studies Review, vol. IX, no. 4(2012). 
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overview of the concepts, narrowing them down to simple definitions applicable in 
my theoretical framework. The concepts will be discussed in chronological order, 
starting with the oldest concept, that of nationalism. I have chosen to do my 
discussion in chronological order because I believe it highlights the importance if the 
concepts, as well as the fact that they are products not only of the time in which they 
originated, but also of each other. And so, as we will see, the concept of fascism is 
greatly influenced by nationalism, just as the concept of populism is influenced by 
both fascism and nationalism. 
 
Nationalism 
The concept of nationalism is relatively new, and the most common meanings were 
developed during the 20th century. Nationalism may refer to feelings of patriotism in 
the form of strong bonds towards the constitutions of one’s nation, including 
language, culture, history, and shared ancestry (ethnicity), to mention some. This 
definition is at once both subjective and objective. It is subjective in its reference to 
feelings of belonging, and objective in reference to the concrete factors that one may 
have in common, such as language, culture, and so on. In that way it is inspired by 
Joseph Stalin, who said that 
 
[a] nation is an historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a 
common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a 
common culture24 
 
However, it is also inspired by Benedict Anderson, who in his book Imagined 
Communities defined the nation as ‘an imagined political community – and imagined 
as both inherently limited and sovereign.’25 But most of all, it is inspired by Anthony 
D. Smith, who in his book Nationalism has tried to summarise all the previous usages 
of the term nationalism in the following five main points: 
                                            
24 Joseph Stalin [1973], quoted in Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism. Cambridge/Malden, MA: Polity 
Press, 2001:11. 
25 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, London/New York: Verso, 2006[1983]:6. 
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1) a process of formation, or growth, of nations 
2) a sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation 
3) a language and symbolism of the nation 
4) a social and political movement on behalf of the nation 
5) a doctrine and/or ideology of the nation, both general and particular26 
 
The first point highlights nationalism as a process and should be directly linked with 
the term ‘nation’. According to Benedict Anderson the ‘nation’ is an imagined 
political community. 27  It is imagined because those who define themselves as 
members of a nation ‘will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or 
even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.’28 In 
other words there is an idea of a unity, something that they all have in common and 
that holds them together within the borders of the same community. The borders 
imply that the nation is limited, and beyond the boundaries of this imagined 
community one can find other nations.  
 
This leads us to Smith’s second point, for the nation is also imagined as a 
‘community’, referring to deep-felt emotions of belonging. It is this imagined 
horizontal comradeship that makes it possible for so many of its members to willingly 
die for their nation. This process or growth of nations should not only be seen as a 
product of history, but also as a product of modern developments. In short, Anderson 
argues that these imagined communities are ideologically constructed through what he 
calls ‘print capitalism’, referring to the development of the printing press which made 
it possible to spread information to a much larger part of the population.  
 
Smith remarks that is important to distinguish between the second point and the 
following three. Though they can be closely related, a national sentiment or 
                                            
26 Smith 2001:5–6.  
27 Anderson 2006[1983].  
28 ibid., 6.  
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consciousness of belonging can exist without ideology, symbolism and a political 
movement. The term nationalism should therefore be understood here as referring to 
the last three points, and I will therefore consider them together. 
 
Many have written about the importance of language and symbolism in creating 
unity.29 In strong forms of nationalism, all of those who do not belong are considered 
anomalous and may be shunned. In a nation it is usually in the interest of the ruling 
party to have support from a more or less unified people. If there is no obvious 
foundation for creating unity, this can be artificially created through the use of 
symbols. Some have argued that politics cannot be purely instrumental, but must 
involve symbols that have the power of creating loyalty and a feeling of belonging.30 
The typical nation-state would therefore draw on similarities or known symbols, such 
as the national flag, to create a form of unity. Previous studies have shown that 
nationalism frequently draws on religion and myth when creating symbols. Bruce 
Kapferer, for one, has done a study of violence and nationalism in Sri Lanka and 
Australia.31 His study shows that in these two cases, nationalism functioned to instil 
passions and profound emotions in those who followed it. This can also be seen in 
modern Greece, where Golden Dawn has made use of the old Minoan symbol of the 
Meandros as the party emblem. According to Eriksen, ‘[t]he use of presumedly [sic] 
typical ethnic symbols in nationalism is intended to stimulate reflection on one’s own 
cultural distinctiveness and thereby create a feeling of nationhood.’32 I will get back to 
this in Chapter 3, as well as in Chapter 6 on Golden Dawn. 
 
In Chapter 3, I write that Greece in the 19th century saw the need for the building of 
both nation and nationality. Nation building was a common phenomenon throughout 
the 19th century and though many found it difficult to define exactly what it was, the 
idea behind it was simple: to create unity. In modern Greece, nationalism has been 
                                            
29 Smith 2001; Eriksen 2010. 
30 Eriksen 2010:121. 
31 Referred to in Eriksen 2010:129. 
32 ibid., 124. 
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used to build the nation-state, but it has also been used to emphasise the creation of a 
national identity, i.e., a Greek nationality. However, the creation of such unity has also 
led to an increase in xenophobia, or fear of the unknown, and a frequent report of 
shunning of those who are not considered ‘Greek’. The question, then, is to whom 
exactly does this unity apply? When it comes to language, symbols and even national 
ideology, all three can be used to promote the ‘well-being’ of the nation. According to 
Smith the goals to a nation’s well-being are national autonomy, national unity and 
national identity.33  In the case of Greece, one could claim that neither of these existed 
beyond the creation of the modern Greek state. As I will later come to argue, it was 
therefore necessary to go back to the ‘roots’ of the Greek people, building a 
connection between ancient Greece and the prospects of a new nation independent of 
the Ottoman Empire. This understanding of nationalism is essential if one wishes to 
understand the developments in Greece between 1821 and today. 
 
Fascism 
Defining fascism is difficult, since most fascist movements have elements that are 
unique, or at least differ from other similar movements. Finding a definition that can 
be considered omnibus, is therefore not without difficulties. Originally used as a word 
of salutation by Benito Mussolini in the early 1920s, fascism has come to describe 
authoritarian movements, and especially the Italian fascist movement of Mussolini 
and the Nazism of Adolf Hitler. In the case of Golden Dawn, media have to a larger 
extent come to use the term neo-Nazi in their description of the party, referring to 
their strong nationalistic tendencies and, many would point out, similarities to the 
German Nazism.34 This is despite the fact that Golden Dawn does not consider itself 
to be a neo-Nazi party.  
 
What, then, does fascism consist of? In Fascism: Comparison and Definition, Payne 
offers a typological description of Fascism based on: 
                                            
33 Smith 2001:9. 
34 Associated Press, ‘Golden Dawn: leader of far-right party lashes out at Greece's “traitors”’, The 
Guardian, 06.05.2012. 
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A. The Fascist Negations 
B. Ideology and Goals 
C. Style and Organisation.35 
 
This description is helpful when distinguishing between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ fascism. 
In the introduction to The Extreme Right, Aurel Braun indicates that though fascism 
traditionally was seen as the most serious threat to democracy, the radical rightist 
parties are the ones that mostly hold this threat today. Thereby he creates a distinction 
between fascism and radical right parties, claiming that the latter only share a 
superficial resemblance to the old fascist regimes.36 Some have claimed that there has 
been a move away from defining generic fascism as a style or organisational structure, 
and towards a larger focus on the ideological core of fascism.37 This suggests that 
fascism could be divided between an old and a new version. The question, then, is 
when did the concept of fascism change? A useful division is done between ‘old’ 
inter-war fascism and the ‘new’ post-war fascism, with the Second World War as the 
peak of the ‘old’ fascism.  
 
The nature of fascism 
Payne should be complemented with Roger Griffin. In his work, The Nature of 
Fascism, Griffin seeks to create a general definition of fascism that may fit and 
include all elements of fascist movements throughout the 20th century. 38 The premises 
for Griffin’s discussion were that fascism could not be given an absolute definition 
                                            
35 Stanley G. Payne, Fascism: Comparison and Definition, Madison: The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1980:7; See also Stanley Payne, ‘The Concept of Fascism’, in Stein Uglevik Larsen, Bernt 
Hagtvet & Jan Petter Myklebust (eds.). Who were the Fascists. Social Roots of Europea Fascism. 
Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1980. 
36 Aurel Braun, ‘Introduction’, Aurel Braun & Stephen Scheinberg (eds.) The Extreme Right. 
Freedom and Security at Risk, Oxford/Colorado: Westview Press, 1997:2. 
37 Roger Griffin, ‘Fascism’s new faces (and new facelessness) in the “post-fascist” epoch’, in 
Roger Griffin, Werner Loh and Andreas Umland (eds.), Fascism Past and Present, West and East, 
Stuttgart: ibidem Verlag, 2006. 
38 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, London: Routledge, 1994[1991]:44; Stanley G. Payne, A 
History of Fascism 1914-45, Oxon: Routledge, 2005[1995]:5. 
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because it was an ideal type. Griffin therefore wished to ‘identify a common core of 
fascist phenomena which can be treated as its definitional minimum’, to ‘clarify how 
fascism relates to a number of other social scientific terms’, to ‘complement […] what 
has been established by existing historical scholarship about the dynamics of 
particular movements and regimes which it identifies as members of the family of 
generic fascisms’, and lastly to ‘represent an advance on existing ideal types in terms 
of succinctness and manageability’, all for the purpose of establishing a generic 
definition of fascism.39 There are ten a priori features of fascism as a political 
ideology that could be used as a starting point for further research. Somewhat 
simplified, these ten features will be summed up below. 
 
Fascism is driven by an ideology that is all-consuming and visible not only in their 
politics, but also in their speeches, songs, symbols and writings (i). It is an 
omnipresent worldview, often with a utopian revolutionary aspect (ii), even though 
only a fantasy, or a ‘travesty’, as Griffin puts it, of this utopia will ever be realised 
(iii). Outsiders will interpret the fascist thought as propaganda, but supporters will see 
it as an outlet for idealism and self-sacrifice (iv). The fascists will try to rationalise 
their worldview by appealing to historical, religious or scientific ‘facts’, though in 
truth it will mainly be driven by irrationality and mythical assumptions (v). 
Commitment may be displayed on varying levels of both emotional intensity and 
active support, and so too the motivation for joining (vi, viii). The fascist ideas may be 
expressed both in a sophisticated and a simpler manner, and many of its supporters 
may have individual interpretations of the goals of the movement (vii). It is not 
possible to reduce the fascist ideology and movement to the ideology of a single 
individual ideologue or a leader; rather it is a response to historical as well as 
contemporary surroundings (ix). Lastly, generic fascism is ‘definable ideal-typically 
in terms of a cluster of values and goals common to all its various permutations, in 
                                            
39 Griffin 1994[1991]:12-13. 
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other words its ideological core’ (x).40 Taking this into account, Griffin ended up with 
the following definition: 
 
Fascism is a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a 
palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism.41 
 
The mythic core of fascism as political ideology is essential. ‘Mythic’ here refer to 
‘the inspirational, revolutionary power which an ideology can exert whatever its 
apparent rationality or practicality.’42 In other words, the mythic core is the basis of 
the ideology as such, and may also be one of the main gathering forces of the 
movement. The revolutionary power should be seen together with what Griffin 
characterises as ‘palingenetic’. Palingenetic is most often translated as ‘rebirth’, but 
should not necessarily be interpreted as ‘backwards-looking’, i.e., as the rebirth of 
something old. Rather, it should simply be seen as something new, after a period of 
decadence. This could be a new order, a new society, or even the birth of ‘a new man’. 
In other words, palingenetic may refer to the emphasis on the rebirth of the national 
spirit, culture and society, and it should therefore be linked with nationalism, as will 
be discussed below. It is worth noting that The Manifesto of Golden Dawn frequently 
speaks of the creation of a new world order and specifically of the birth of a new type 
of man (see Chapter 6). 
 
As for populist ultra-nationalism, Griffin divides the concept into two. By defining 
each part separately he emphasises that ‘populist’ should be understood as ‘a generic 
term for political forces which, even if led by small elite cadres or self-appointed 
“vanguards”, in practice or in principle […] depend on “people power” as the basis of 
their legitimacy.’ 43  ‘Ultra-nationalism’, on the other hand, refers to ‘forms of 
nationalism which “go beyond”, and hence reject, anything compatible with liberal 
                                            
40 ibid. 
41 ibid., 26, my emphases. 
42 ibid., 28. 
43 ibid., 36-37. 
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institutions or with the tradition of Enlightenment humanism which underpins them.’44 
It is only combined that the two can be used as a fascist minimum in a generic 
definition. 
 
A. The fascist negations 
Going back to Payne, his first point could also be referred to as ‘what fascism is not’. 
The negations that are listed by Payne are anti-liberalism, anti-communism and anti-
conservatism, but the list could easily have been expanded to include other negations. 
Many scholars have focused on fascism as an anti-phenomenon, referring to what it 
opposes rather than what it consists of. Payne, as we have seen, is no exception. 
Griffin, on the other hand, disagrees with this. Fascism should not only be 
characterised through its ‘anti-’ dimension, but rather one needed to identify an 
ideological core applicable to a generic definition, as stated above. 
 
B. Ideology and goals 
Payne’s second point is a bit more complex than the first. Fascist movements seek the 
creation of a new nationalist authoritarian state. They seek the organisation of a new 
kind of ‘regulated, multiclass, integrated national economic structure, whether called 
national corporatist, national socialist, or national syndicalist’. 45  They are 
revolutionary, meaning that they seek a radical change in the nation’s relationship 
with other powers. However, they also seek to realise ‘a new form of modern, self-
determined, secular culture.’46 Griffin too seems to emphasise revolution in particular 
as one of the primary objectives of a fascist regime. As an example, Griffin, in a short 
analysis, called the regime of Metaxas (1936–41) ‘fascism from above’, referring to 
how Metaxas embarked on a campaign to persuade the Greeks that they formed a 
‘blood community’.47 As other nationalist movements in Greece, he spoke of the 
connection between ancient and modern Greece, and wished to create the Third 
                                            
44 ibid, 37. 
45 Payne 1980:7. 
46 ibid. 
47 Griffin 1994[1991]:122. 
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Hellenic Civilisation. However, since the revolutionary ideas and ideals of Metaxas 
were never put into reality through any sort of social revolution Griffin characterises 
the regime solely as a para-fascist dictatorship.48 Even so, it should be mentioned that 
Griffin solely speaks of the regime. Whether or not the movement and ideology of 
Metaxas could also be categorised as ‘para-fascist’, is not for this thesis to analyse, 
but the distinction should be remembered during my later account of XA as a 
movement (Chapters 6 and 7). 
 
C. Style and organisation 
As for the third point, fascism emphasises the use of aesthetic structure, symbols, 
political choreography, and they also stress romantic and mystical aspects. They 
attempt mass-mobilisation and emphasise a militant political leadership, with the goal 
of a mass party militia. The masculine principle and male dominance is of the utmost 
importance; so is the exaltation of youth. Lastly, the style and organisation is 
authoritarian and charismatic, with a personal style of command. The ‘mystical 
aspects’ can be compared with the ‘mythical core’ that governs ideology in Griffin’s 
definition.  
 
Payne’s typological description is created for the purpose of separating fascist 
movements from other revolutionary or nationalist movements. Though such a 
tripartite division may be useful, it is meant merely as an analytical tool, and it can 
here mostly be related to the ‘old’ inter-war fascism, referred to above. Even so, as we 
will see in Chapter 6, elements of both A, B and C can still be found in more modern 
movements with visibly fascist inspirations, such as Golden Dawn. 
 
Fascism and Nazism 
The term fascism still holds strong connotations to the fascist regimes of Mussolini 
and Hitler, and similar authoritarian nationalist movements today are mostly 
categorised as belonging to ‘the radical right’. The most profound difference between 
                                            
48 ibid. 
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the old fascists and the new radical right is the willingness of the latter to be 
categorised at the right end of the political spectrum. As Payne has noted in a later 
work, the number of neo-fascist and right radical or authoritarian groups has increased 
over the last decades, and there are several different kinds of neo-fascists that can be 
identified.49 It is common that such neo-fascists present themselves as ‘national 
revolutionaries’, and there are some who advocate more extreme forms of National 
Socialism, including a tendency toward ‘social racism’ (in the case of Nazism); as I 
will argue later, this is also a prominent feature in the ideology of Golden Dawn. 
 
Both ‘fascism’ and ‘Nazism’ has been used to describe extreme right movements – so 
too in the case of Golden Dawn. In the words of Eugen Weber the main difference 
between the two can be found in that whilst ‘Fascism is pragmatically activist, 
National Socialism is theoretically motivated or, at least, expressed.’50 By this he 
refers to the two ideologies’ use of power through parties. Whereas the fascist party 
will use the power pragmatically and piecemeal, simply for its own sake, the national 
socialist party would use the power to realise an anterior plan inspired by the original 
doctrine. Once in power, the fascist party will gradually disintegrate, but the national 
socialist party may increase its influential position in society and become similar to a 
‘church’.51 It is tempting, then, to compare it with generic fascism and say that 
National Socialism may in fact be the mythical core of fascism. Though both terms 
may be used separately, it has been common to define National Socialism (or Nazism) 
as a sub-category of fascism. In that way National Socialism can be seen as a part of 
fascism, but the opposite is more difficult to defend. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
49 Payne 2005[1995]:498. 
50 Eugene Weber, ‘Extract from Varieties of Fascism’, Roger Griffin and Matthew Feldman (eds.) 
Fascism. Critical concepts in political science, volume I: The Nature of Fascism, London/New York: 
Routledge, 2004:80. 
51 ibid. 
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Populism 
There are two main reasons why the concept of populism is relevant in this thesis. 
First of all, I believe that XA’s effective use of populism might have been a 
contributing factor to the party’s sudden rise in popularity. Second, as we will see, 
understanding the concept of populism is essential for understanding the concept of 
the extreme right.  
 
There are two commonly accepted interpretations of the concept of populism. The 
first is when politics is used to stir people’s emotions by offering simplistic solutions. 
The second is when it is used to ‘describe opportunistic policies with the aim of 
(quickly) pleasing the people/voters – and so “buying” their support – rather than 
looking (rationally) for the “best option”.’52 Populism can be found on both ends of 
the political spectrum, though it is most often associated with the (radical) right. The 
concept and phenomenon of populism have often been ‘blamed’ for the success of 
more radical right parties. And it can also be seen in connection with the role of the 
media.53 Cas Mudde has defined populism as: 
 
[…] an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and 
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics 
should be an expression of the volonté general (general will) of the people.54 
 
This definition emphasises a cleavage in society between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’. 
Though many have written and agree about this cleavage, the question of what 
populism is still remains to be answered. Is it ‘…an ideology, a syndrome, a political 
movement or a political style?’55 The definition by Mudde above states that it is an 
ideology, but other definitions have chosen to emphasise the rhetorical function of 
populism, making it more a political style than an ideology. Margaret Canovan, for 
                                            
52 Cas Mudde, ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, Government and Opposition, vol. 39, no. 4(2004):542. 
53 Mudde 2004. 
54 ibid., 543. 
55 ibid. 
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one, has written that populism can be understood as ‘an appeal to “the people” against 
both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values…’56 In 
other words, populism is closely related to the demos in democracy. This is also in 
line with Anthony Painter’s definition of populism as a democratic argument:  
 
It is ‘democratic’ in the sense that it appeals to common conceptions that the rule of the 
people is a good thing, and it is an ‘argument’ rather than a particular ideology or set of 
policies.57  
 
The people can here be defined in many ways, for it is not my impression that many 
parties that make use of populist rhetoric agree with the majority on who the people 
consist of. The past years have seen an increase in what has been termed ‘xenophobic 
populism’, in which the wish to end immigration has been used in populist rhetoric to 
gain larger support, especially in times of economic crisis.58 
 
One of the reasons why it may be difficult to distinguish between National Socialist, 
fascist and populist movements is because all three share similar elements. Put another 
way, populism may be used as a political style for fascist movements, and many 
consider fascism as an umbrella definition for both National Socialist and, I dare say, 
populist movements. For instance, many theorists have seen populist ultra-nationalism 
as an important part of the fascist ideology.59 Distinguishing between the concepts is 
therefore not the same as isolating them entirely.  
 
                                            
56 Margaret Canovan, ‘Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy’, in Political 
Studies, XLVII(1999):2; See also Margaret Canovan, ‘Populism for Political Theorists?’, in Journal 
of Political Ideologies, vol. 9, no.3(2004). 
57 William Brett, ‘What’s an Elite to Do? The Threat of Populism from Left, Right and Centre’, in 
The Political Quarterly, vol. 84, no. 3(2013):410. 
58 See Aristos Doxiadis & Manos Matsaganis, National populism and xenophobia in Greece, 
Counterpoint, 2012; Brett 2013. 
59 See Griffin 1994[1991]; Kevin Passmore, Fascism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002. 
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The extreme right family:  
The populist radical right vs. the extreme right 
 
Klaus von Beyme and the ‘familles spirituelles’ 
How does one define the members of a party family? Klaus von Beyme speaks of 
‘familles spirituelles’ that can be found at the ideological level of the parties. Von 
Beyme has distinguished nine such ‘spiritual families’:  
 
(i) Liberal and radical parties 
(ii) Conservative parties  
(iii) Socialist and social democratic parties 
(iv) Christian democratic parties  
(v) Communist parties  
(vi) Agrarian parties  
(vii) Regional and ethnic parties  
(viii) Right-wing extremist parties  
(ix) The ecology movement60 
 
This division is done on the basis of two ideological criteria, namely the name of the 
party and the voters’ perception of the party’s ideological position as well as the party 
programmes. This creates a guideline for distinguishing between the party families, 
but not of the individual parties that constitute these families. Furthermore, in the case 
of right-wing extremist parties, actually placing these parties within the eighth family 
mentioned above, leads to some problems that need to be addressed. First of all, most 
right-wing extremist parties deny being extreme, and some even object to being called 
right-wing. Defining a party’s belonging in the party family on the basis of party name 
and voters’ perception is therefore close to impossible. Who, then, should be allowed 
to define and classify? An obvious suggestion is the researchers, but even they seem 
                                            
60 See Cas Mudde. The ideology of the extreme right. Manchester/New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2000:2; Klaus von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1985:3. 
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to have some trouble agreeing on a name for the party family, referring to it as ‘the 
radical populist right’, ‘the extreme right’ or just ‘the far right’, to mention some.61 
 
Based on the framework of Klaus von Beyme, Anders Widfeldt divides the most 
common labels of extreme right parties into three groups:62 
 
Group 1: ‘neo-fascist’ 
Group 2: ‘extreme right’ (and ‘right-wing extremist’), ‘far right’, ‘radical right’ 
Group 3: ‘populist right’, ‘right-wing populist’ 
 
Widfeldt also speaks of labels that overlap group 2 and 3. I have chosen to call this 
group 4: 
 
Group 4 (2+3): ‘populist radical right’, ‘radical right-wing populist’ 
 
Again we see the reference to the concepts mentioned above, with a higher frequency 
of the label ‘populist’ and more of an ideological relation to ‘fascism’. To label a 
party as ‘extreme’ has two primary meanings: Either it means that the party is extreme 
relative to other parties or that it is extreme relative to the existing political system. 
The last meaning has a revolutionary aspect to it that is not as common today as it was 
during the time of the French Revolution, but even so I believe that opposing the 
existing system is a common feature in modern Greek history even to this day. 
 
‘Radicalism’,  ‘extremism’ and ‘populism’ 
Cas Mudde divides the radical right party family into two, distinguishing between 
populist radical right and extreme right-wing parties. In The ideology of the extreme 
right, Mudde distinguishes between ‘radicalism’ and ‘extremism’ by saying that 
whereas the former is verfassungswidrig, meaning that it is opposed to the 
                                            
61 This discussion draws on Mudde 2000; See also Anders Widfeldt, ‘A fourth phase of the 
extreme right? Nordic immigration-critical parties in a comparative context’ in 
NORDEUROPAforum, ½(2010). 
62 Widfeldt 2010. 
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constitution, the latter is verfassungsfeindlich, or hostile to the constitution.63 This 
difference is of the utmost practical importance for the involved political parties since 
extremist parties are usually extensively watched and can even be banned, whereas 
radical parties are usually left alone to a greater extent.64  
 
Mudde has also noted the more frequent use of the term populism in relation to the 
extreme right, with variants such as ‘right-wing populism’, ‘radical right-wing 
populism’, ‘national populism’, ‘new populism’, ‘neo-populism’ and so on.65 Some of 
these are already mentioned in the Widfeldt-inspired group 4 above, and the rest could 
easily be added. According to Mudde, there is not a significant difference between the 
term populism and the term extreme right. For instance, he has identified two different 
uses of the term populism in relationship with the term extremism in the literature. In 
the first it is used to describe the more moderate parties of the extreme right. In the 
second it is used ‘exclusively to describe a certain political style used by right-wing 
extremist parties.’ 66  The various terms are often used synonymously, and not 
necessarily with any clear intention. In fact, Mudde himself chooses to use the term 
‘populist radical right’ in a later work.67 
 
In an attempt to clarify these concepts, Anders Jupskås has contributed to the 
literature with a similar division of the far right.68 He distinguishes between the 
‘extreme’, ‘radical’ and ‘populist’ right. Common features among the classes of 
extreme right include anti-democracy, ethnic nationalism, authoritarianism, racism, 
xenophobia, and what Jupskås has called ‘conspiracy theorists’.69 It is interesting to 
note that according to Jupskås, the extreme right does not need to fulfil all of the 
                                            
63 Mudde 2000:12. 
64 ibid. 
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66 ibid. 
67 See Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007.  
68 Anders Ravik Jupskås, Ekstreme Europa. Ideologi, årsaker og konsekvenser, Oslo: Cappelen 
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above-mentioned features, but they should all be seen in connection with anti-
democracy, the most prominent one. In short, the largest difference between the 
extreme right and the radical right is that the latter is not considered anti-democratic. 
Neither is it characterised by biological racism.70 The populist right is similar to the 
radical right, but the ‘populist’ part, i.e., the appeal to the will or wishes of the people 
is one of its more dominant features. This division should still only be seen as a 
guideline for a definition, as each and every movement may differ according to its 
historical and cultural context. 
 
Defining the extreme right 
How do extremists go from the margins to the mainstream? The extreme right can be 
seen as a phenomenon that comes in ‘waves’, meaning that there are periods when the 
extreme right parties enjoy a larger degree of support than others. A lot of research 
has therefore been done trying to establish why such parties often see an intermittent 
increase in their support. Previous studies have shown that there is a link between 
economic decline and extremism, but that economic decline cannot be the only 
factor.71 De Bromhead et al. have tried to generalise the growth of political extremism 
in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. According to them, ‘[e]xplanations for political 
extremism in this period fall into five broad categories: economic factors, social 
cleavages, external influences, electoral systems, and institutional/cultural 
inheritances’.72 If they have succeeded in generalising the case of Germany beyond 
the designated time period it should be possible to find elements of all five categories 
in what is happening in present-day Greece as well (See Chapter 7).  
 
Michi Ebata defines the extreme right by looking at some of its core features. These 
features include a fundamental expression of hatred or prejudice that is rooted in an 
                                            
70 ibid., 49. 
71 De Bromhead et al. 2012. 
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‘ideology of inequality’. 73 This view is especially manifested in forms of xenophobia, 
racism, homophobia, misogyny and religious intolerance. The hatred may also be 
directed towards the state. As the author notes: 
 
[…] hatred is far more than just an expressed sentiment; it is a source of action dedicated to 
expelling the offending outsider from society in order to remake society into its ‘purer 
historical’ form.74 
 
Piero Ignazi gives a simpler definition. He has classified the whole family of extreme 
right parties according to the following three criteria: 
 
1) Placement at the far right of the national political spectrum 
2) Fascist features in the party ideology 
3) Negative attitude toward the political system75 
 
He then goes on to use these criteria to distinguish between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ 
extreme right, claiming that whereas the new extreme right is usually selected on the 
basis of the first and third criteria, the old combine all three. Again we are reminded 
of Aurel Braun’s above claim that the new radical right only shares a superficial 
resemblance to the old fascist regimes, and that fascism as it was has ceased to be a 
serious threat in the Western World.76 A lot seems to have changed in the nearly two 
decades that have passed since Braun made his arguments. Today, one does not have 
to look far to find radical right parties with clear fascist inspirations if not also 
aspirations.77  
 
                                            
73 Michi Ebata, ‘Right –Wing Extremism: In Search of a Definition’, in Aurel Braun & Stephen 
Scheinberg (eds.) The Extreme Right. Freedom and Security at Risk, Oxford/Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1997. 
74 Ebata 1997:14. 
75 Piero Ignazi, ‘The silent counter-revolution. Hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right-
wing parties in Europe’, in European Journal of Political Research, vol. 22, no. 1–2(1992). 
76 Braun 1997; Payne 1980. 
77 Payne 2005[1995]. 
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Defining the extreme may be easy, but distinguishing between the extremities may be 
more difficult. One of the most common ways of defining the extreme right is through 
its features. The study of right-wing extremism has differed over the years, and one 
often hears talk of ‘waves’ of right-wing extremism, as mentioned above. During and 
right after these ‘waves’ there is an increase in the publications on such issues and 
parties. In The ideology of the extreme right, Cas Mudde has tried to give an overview 
of previous definitions of the extreme right.78 Some of these definitions are based on 
only one single feature, thereby obscuring other important features of their ideology.79 
Others say that right-wing extremism can be defined by a combination of features that 
constitutes a political ideology. 80  All in all, Mudde found twenty-six different 
definitions in the literature that includes a total of fifty-eight different features of the 
extreme right. Only five of these features are mentioned by at least half of the authors, 
namely: nationalism, xenophobia, racism, anti-democracy and the strong state.81 In 
other words, one cannot define the extreme right without taking into account what 
they reject, such as democracy, human rights or capitalism, to mention a few. I have 
chosen to call these the negations, inspired by the fascist negations mentioned above. 
 
Terms such as ‘right-wing’, ‘right-wing extremist’ and ‘far right’ have all been used 
to describe Golden Dawn, and at times it seems that neither researchers nor journalists 
agree on what exactly, if anything at all, distinguishes these concepts from each other. 
However, inspired by the known right–left line of politics I choose to place the 
concepts on the political spectrum in the following way: 
 
Extremists ß Far Left ß Left   ß CENTRE à  Right à Far Right à Extremists 
 
                                            
78 Mudde 2000:10. 
79 ibid.; See also Cas Mudde, ‘The single‐issue party thesis: Extreme right parties and the 
immigration issue’, in West European Politics, vol. 22, no. 3(1999). 
80 Mudde 2000:10. 
81 Mudde 2000; Cas Mudde, ‘Right-wing extremism analyzed. A comparative analysis of the 
ideologies of three alleged right-wing extremist parties (NPD, NDP, CP’86)’, in European Journal of 
Political Research, vol. 27, no. 2(1995). 
32 
  
There are three things that should be noted about this division. First of all, the terms 
‘right-wing’/’left wing’ are not left out, but stand instead as subcategories of the ‘Far 
Left’ and ‘Far Right’. I do not by this suggest that there is not some nuance to the 
concepts at either of the far ends of the spectrum, in fact it would be possible to create 
a spectrum within the concepts of the ‘far right’ and the ‘far left’, thereby 
distinguishing between the ‘least extreme’ and the ‘most extreme’. When I have 
chosen not to do so, it is solely for the following simple reason: I do not think that it is 
fruitful to distinguish between extremities, since they have all already gone beyond 
what is considered ‘normal’. When I refer to something as ‘far right’, I do so with the 
notion of the ‘far right’ being an ‘umbrella definition’. 
 
Second, ‘right’ here does not refer to the traditional ‘right’, but rather to a more 
populist and radical direction in politics. A more specified version of the spectrum 
should therefore look more like this, now only concentrating on the right side: 
 
CENTRE à Populist right à Radical right-wing populists à Extreme right 
 
To distinguish between these categories, it might be useful to use other known far 
right parties. For instance, I would place the Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) under 
the category populist right. FrP is populist in the sense that it frequently uses people’s 
opinions to create policies that they know will please the majority of their voters. It 
shares some of the fascist negations, already mentioned, in particular anti-
immigration, but it is not anti-system or revolutionary per se. Instead FrP wish to 
change the system through legitimate means, i.e., by winning the majority vote during 
elections. It should be noted that though I have chosen to categorise FrP as populist, 
Piero Ignazi have claimed that FrP belong to the extreme right, arguing that they fit 
point 1 and 3 in his three-point definition mentioned above.82 Moving on to the next 
category, I would place the French Front National within the category of radical right-
wing populists, slightly more extreme than FrP. Lastly, compared to the other two and 
                                            
82 See Piero Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
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in line with previous definitions, including the three-point-definition by Piero Ignazi, 
Golden Dawn should be placed within the category of the extreme right. 
 
Third, in the introduction I followed Uwe Backes when I said that nothing could 
exceed the extreme.83 In this categorisation of right–left politics I have chosen to 
make one exception, or rather, two, in that I’ve placed extremists at both ends of the 
spectrum. It is one thing to be extreme; it is another to be an extremist. And so, both 
radical and extremist parties may be extreme in politics measured by their opinions 
and their opposition to the ‘centre’. However, the most important difference between 
the populist right, the radical right-wing populists and the extreme right is that where 
the former two would rather prefer to change the existing system through the system 
itself – in other words by taking part in the democracy and gain power through 
(legitimate) elections – only the latter would be willing to take lives, if necessary, to 
accomplish their goals.84 
 
Far right parties should not only be categorised by their policies and goals, but rather 
by the measures they are willing to take to achieve them. However, the extremists 
may also be known for what they are against, similar to Payne’s definition of fascism. 
As the fascist movements could be defined by the fascist negations, so too could the 
extremists. And so both fascists and extremists are known to be against the political 
system; they explicitly criticise democracy and oppose human rights. In that way 
Golden Dawn should clearly be classified as fascist however, it is also extreme in the 
sense that they oppose the existing system and are willing to take extreme measures to 
accomplish their goals. For my approach, I have chosen to focus on the features of 
nationalism, fascism and populism, as defined above. In my later analysis of the 
ideology of Golden Dawn (Chapters 6 and 7), those are the features that will guide my 
discussion. 
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3 1821–1949: Shaping Modern Greece 
 
1821–1923: The building of nation and nationality 
 
From independence to the First World War 
The independent state of Greece was established in 1821, with the first constitution 
proclaimed in 1822. In the period following independence, Greece experienced a 
series of tumults, often related to the western powers. In 1827 Ioannis Kapodistrias 
became the first president, but when he was assassinated in 1831, the Convention of 
London decided to turn Greece into a monarchy and offered the ‘hereditary 
sovereignty’ of Greece to Otto, the second son of Ludwig I of Bavaria. The new state 
was built according to western European ideals, and in many ways it was the western 
powers that ascended the throne when King Otto arrived in his new kingdom in 1833, 
aged only 17. Britain, Russia and France guaranteed the protection of this new 
monarchical state. 
 
Close to thirty years later, in 1862, King Otto was forced from his throne, after a 
revolt supported by the army. King George I, a Danish prince, replaced him a year 
later. Also at the age of 17, he ascended the throne as King of the Hellenes, and would 
become the longest-reigning king in the history of the modern Greek state. King 
George was assassinated by a madman in 1913, and was then replaced by his eldest 
son, Konstantinos I. 
 
In the early 1900s it became increasingly clear that it was the prime minister that 
would become the most important political player and not the king – nor later the 
elected presidents. Even so, the cleavage between the royalists and the republicans 
would continue to dominate politics for years to come. In 1910, the Cretan Eleftherios 
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Venizelos, founder of the Liberal Party, became prime minister.85 The decade that 
followed would be termed the ‘Venizelist decade’. Venizelos was quickly to be 
known as a reformist, and during his first few months in office he implemented many 
minor constitutional changes. Venizelos resigned in 1915, following a disagreement 
with King Konstantinos I. The king favoured Germany and wished for Greek 
neutrality in the First World War. Venizelos, on the other hand, feared the loss of the 
Aegean Islands to the Ottoman Empire. He therefore argued for entering the war on 
the side of the Triple Entente.86 
 
Greek politics was highly unstable at the start of the First World War. Venizelos won 
the election in June, just a few months after his forced resignation, and returned to 
power in August, only to be forced to resign again in October. In the year that 
followed Greece was divided into two. Venizelos travelled to Thessaloniki and 
established a provisional government of ‘New’ Greece. Meanwhile the royalist 
government in Athens held the ‘Old’ Greece, and successfully managed to defend the 
port of Piraeus from an Anglo-French invasion, the result of which ended in a British 
and French blockade of the ‘Old’ Greece. 
 
From the Treaty of Sèvres to the Greek-Turkish War 
The early 20th century witnessed the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. It also saw the 
end of Greece’s territorial expansion. The end of the First World War was marked 
with the Conference of Paris in 1919, the result of which was the Treaty of Sèvres in 
1920. The treaty recognised Greece’s annexation of Thrace and the Aegean Islands, 
with the exception of the Dodecanese Islands that were under Italian occupation until 
1947. The Treaty of San Remo, also from 1920, allowed Greece to exercise sovereign 
rights over Smyrna (Izmir) for a transition period of five years.87 
                                            
85 It is interesting to note that even though Venizelos as a Cretan became prime minister in 1910, 
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Venizelos had participated at the Conference of Paris in 1919, and there he had 
spoken for the protection for the Greek populations living in Anatolia. The Treaty of 
Sèvres, however, was mainly concerned with the protection of the ethnic groups of the 
Ottoman Empire, although Armenia saw its independence, Kurdistan gained 
autonomy and even Greece saw significant changes to its territory.88 
 
The settlement after the First World War and the Treaty of Sèvres was the closest 
Modern Greece had ever been to fulfilling the Megali Idea. This great idea was an 
irredentist project, seeking to unite all areas of Greek settlement into a single state 
whose capital would be Constantinople. There were two opposing causes, that of the 
heterochthons, the Greeks outside of the newly independent kingdom, and the 
autochthons, the ‘natives’ that resided within the kingdom. According to Ioannis 
Kolettis, who first voiced the Megali Idea, all who resided within the areas associated 
with Greek history or the Greek race were Greeks.89 During the war the Great Idea 
created a cleavage in society that would be known as the National Schism, or Ethnikos 
Dikhasmos.90 This cleavage would come to play a large part in Greek politics in the 
years that followed. 
 
The military’s gradually increased involvement in politics can be seen in the election 
of 7th of November 1920. Prior to the election, Venizelos wished to expand the 
electorate to include the Greek populations in the newly controlled areas of Smyrna 
and Thrace. He also, for the first time, introduced the military vote. In 1919 the 
Military League had been organised by a group of officers with the purpose of 
intimidating any opposition against Venizelos, and plans were even made for a 
military government in the case of a royal victory.91 King Alexander took over when 
his father went into exile in 1917, but his death in 1920, following blood poisoning 
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caused by a bite from a pet monkey, would once again raise the question of 
constitutional reform. Venizelos had hoped to win the population over by his 
achievements in the Treaty of Sèvres, and many, including Venizelos himself, have 
blamed war weariness for a result that came as a surprise for observers.92 The election 
turned into a fight between Venizelos and the royalists, in which the royalists won 246 
out of 370 seats in parliament.93 Venizelos admitted defeat and went into exile, though 
he would still play a central part in Greek politics for yet another decade. It did not 
take long after the royalist victory before a rigged plebiscite vote made sure of the 
return of King Konstantinos I to the throne.  
 
From the Treaty of Lausanne to the Second Hellenic Republic 
The leader of the Turkish uprising in the early 1920s was General Mustafa Kemal, 
also known as Atatürk. The uprising was a response to the landing of Greek troops in 
Smyrna in 1919. The purpose of this army was to protect the Greek population in the 
area from Turkish reprisals, but instead it resulted in the killing or wounding of 
around 350 Turks, stirring Turkish national sentiment.94 The Greek military soon 
faced defeat and displayed their willingness to negotiate, but Kemal responded with a 
massive offensive that resulted in a Greek evacuation of Smyrna and the massacre of 
close to 30,000 Greek and Armenian Christians.95 
 
The Treaty of Lausanne marked the end of the Asia Minor debacle and the Greek-
Turkish war of 1922–23. The treaty would come to define the relationship both 
between the military and the Greek government, and between Greece and the newly 
independent modern Turkey. However, the treaty is also important if one wishes to 
understand the building of a Greek nationality in the years that followed, especially 
because it provided for an exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece. The 
exchange was done on the basis of religion, and not according to language or culture, 
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creating large groups of Greek-speaking Muslims in Turkey, as well as large groups 
of Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians in Greece. In numbers, the period saw the 
transfer of approximately 1,100,000 Greeks to the Greek Kingdom, whereas only 
380,000 Muslims were transferred to Turkey in return.96 
 
The exchange of populations, as well as the many refugees after the war created new 
challenges for the Greek state. It was now close to an ethnically homogenous state, 
and its borders contained all of the Greek populations in the Near East, with the 
exception of the Italian-occupied Dodecanese Islands and Cyprus, which was now a 
British possession. Yet there was no common nationality and so the cleavage in 
society, the previously mentioned National Schism, deepened even further. In 
September 1922 a group of officers friendly to Venizelos launched a coup headed by 
Colonel Nikolaos Plastiras. And so, shortly before his death, Konstantinos I was yet 
again ousted from the throne and driven into exile. According to Richard Clogg, the 
‘bitterness and chaos of defeat were compounded by the feeling that Greece had been 
abandoned in her hour of greatest need by traditional friends.’97 The result was a hunt 
for scapegoats and eight politicians and soldiers were court-martialled for high 
treason. Six of them were later executed by a firing squad. The ’Trial of the Six’ was 
the torch that again put light to the fire between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists, a 
feud that would go on throughout the inter-war period. 
 
Many among the refugees and dispossessed populations of Greece were still loyal to 
Venizelos, and in the referendum of 1924, many of the new inhabitants of Greece 
voted for the abolition of the monarchy. By then, King George II, the eldest son of 
Konstantinos I, had already left the country.98 
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1924–1949: Instability, war and military dictatorship 
 
From the Second Hellenic Republic to the ‘Regime of the Fourth of 
August’ 
Though the Second Hellenic Republic was proclaimed after the referendum of 1924, 
the constitutional changes were not formally instituted until 1927, when a hero of the 
Balkan wars, Admiral Koundouriotis, was elected president. During the intervening 
years, General Theodore Pangalos had governed Greece in a military dictatorship. 
After General Pangalos was overthrown by the military in 1926 new elections were 
held in which a parliament with representatives of both Venizelists and anti-
Venizelists was elected. The new government paved the way for the return of 
Eleftherios Venizelos who became prime minister in 1928. His time in office was now 
mostly successful in the field of foreign policy, but he also put into practice an 
electoral system based on majority, rather than proportional representation. The 
majority system was effective in alienating smaller parties. 
 
The short dictatorship of General Pangalos had resulted in a threat to go to war with 
Turkey and an invasion of Bulgaria, but during the 1930s, Greece’s relationship with 
its neighbours greatly improved. The Balkan Pact of 1934 was a mutual guarantee of 
the existing frontiers of Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey. Venizelos also 
managed to establish peace between Turkey and Greece during the Ankara 
Convention of 1930. Financially, the Great Crash of 1929 did not affect Greece to a 
more significant degree than many other countries at the time. Even so, the state’s 
economy was vulnerable due to its dependence on luxury exports such as currants and 
olive oil, and in 1933 the government was forced to default on its interest payments of 
foreign loans.99 
 
In the election of 1932, Venizelos’ Liberal Party only held on to a marginal lead on 
the People’s Party. A return to proportional representation resulted in a parliamentary 
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deadlock, and new elections – this time using the majority system – were held a year 
later. This time the People’s Party and its allies secured a majority over the 
Venizelists, a result unacceptable for Colonel Plastiras, who as a response tried to 
force through the will of Venizelos by attempting a coup. The March 1933 coup 
proved to be a failure and Colonel Plastiras was forced into exile. This was the start of 
a highly unstable period in Greek politics, and again, the royalists were stirring. 
Another failed coup in March 1935, this time headed by Venizelist officers and 
supported by Venizelos himself, resulted in the exile of Venizelos. Martial law was 
declared and the election was set to June the same year. The Venizelists chose to 
abstain from the election in protest, and the election therefore resulted in a landslide 
for the People’s Party, with 65 per cent of the votes resulting in 96 per cent of the 
seats in Parliament, or 287 out of 300 seats.100 It should be mentioned that the 
Communists in this election reached their highest per cent of the votes in the interwar 
period, with almost 10 per cent, but because of the majority system they did not 
receive any seats.101 
 
The same year Prime Minister Tsaldaris resigned over the question of restoration of 
the monarchy. The man who replaced him, Lieutenant Georgios Kondylis, 
immediately abolished the republic and restored King George II to the throne after 12 
years in exile. An election was again held in January 1936, under a system of 
proportional representation, and as in 1932 it resulted in a deadlock between the 
People’s Party and the Liberal Party. The inconclusive results left the Communists 
with the balance of power with their hold of 6 per cent of the votes and 15 seats in 
parliament, whereas the Liberal Party and People’s Party had 141 and 143 seats 
respectively out of a total of 300 seats.102  
 
When the minister of war, General Alexander Papagos, informed the king that the 
army would not tolerate a government supported by the Communists, the king 
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responded by immediately replacing him with Ioannis Metaxas. General Metaxas, 
who soon after would become the prime minster, was the leader of the Freethinker’s 
Party, Eleftherofrones, ‘an ultra-right-wing party even more marginal in terms of 
electoral support than the communists.’103 
 
The upcoming regime of the 4th of August was made possible in 1936, after the king, 
under the influence of Metaxas, suspended a number of key articles of the 
constitution. This was the beginning of General Metaxas’ dictatorship. In A Concise 
History of Greece, Richard Clogg puts the dictatorship of Metaxas into a broader 
context, comparing it with other dictatorial regimes at the time. Though described as 
fascist, it was not as dynamic as German Nazism or Italian Fascism. General Metaxas 
was not a fan of the political world, and his rule was authoritarian and backward-
looking. He was obsessed with a wish for instilling discipline into the Greek 
population, and inspired by Hitler, he spoke of creating the ‘Third Hellenic 
Civilisation’. Other similarities with other fascist regimes can be seen in the 
establishment of a National Youth Organisation and the regimes focus on the ‘glory 
days’ of ancient Greece, Sparta and Byzantium. It also shared a loathing of its 
opposition on the far left. Despite this, the regime of Metaxas could be said to be 
weaker than many other similar regimes. For instance, Metaxas did not physically 
eliminate his opponents, but instead tried to create a climate of fear and used this to 
neutralise the opposition.104 Later movements, like the 4th of August Party, have 
explicitly used Metaxas as a symbol of change and inspiration.105 
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The Second World War: the ‘long night of barbarism’106 
As Europe was entering into the Second World War, Metaxas hoped to keep Greece 
out of the hostilities. This was increasingly difficult as Britain and Greece made 
agreements for economic cooperation. In January 1940, both a war trade agreement 
and a shipping agreement were signed between the two countries. In mid-August of 
the same year, an Italian submarine torpedoed a Greek cruiser that partook in a 
pilgrimage celebration of the Virgin Mary. Benito Mussolini wanted to use a war with 
Greece to demonstrate to Germany that Italy was strong enough to win ‘spectacular 
victories’.107 Two months later, on the 28th of October, the Italian Ambassador 
delivered an ultimatum to Metaxas demanding the right of passage of Italian troops 
through Greek territory. Metaxas refused, and met full support both in the population 
and in the Greek government. The Greek army was not prepared for the imminent 
Italian attack, but miraculously managed to push the Italian army back and into 
Albanian territory. 
 
Greece now found itself in a strange position. She was neither an ally of Britain nor at 
war with Germany, yet the short Greek-Italian war was indirectly a part of the World 
War on European soil. Britain had assured Greece that she would come to her 
assistance if needed, but when asked for reinforcements a few days before the Italian 
attack, Britain only said she would do her best. The Greek government wanted a 
British military presence in Greece to help force Italy out of Albania and so create a 
stronger foothold in the Balkan border towards Germany. Though Metaxas rejected a 
British request to station air forces in Thessaloniki, out of fear of provoking Hitler, he 
assured the British that Greece would help them against the Germans, but only after 
they had defeated the Italians. 
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Greece under German occupation 
Greece’s relationship with Britain posed a threat for Hitler, who wished to secure his 
Balkan flank, preparing for the invasion of the Soviet Union. On the 6th of April 1941, 
Hitler therefore invaded Greece and rapidly overcame both British and Greek troops. 
The devastating defeat led to the suicide of Prime Minister Alexandros Koryzis who 
had taken over after the death of Metaxas in late January. The prime minister who 
took office after the death of Koryzis, Emmanouil Tsouderos, was a known opponent 
of the regime of Metaxas. 
 
Hitler’s attack on Greece, under the code name ‘Maritsa’, was a great success, and 
Athens fell on the 23rd of April. King George II, his government and some Greek 
forces had then managed to withdraw to the island of Crete, and hoped to join British 
forces in their defence of the island. Crete was intended as a base for air raids on oil 
fields in Romania, thereby destroying an important source for German fuel supplies. 
The defence of the island only lasted a month, and at the end of May, after fierce 
fighting, Crete fell, and the king and his government withdrew to the Middle East. 
 
Three days before the fall of Athens and without government approval, General 
Georgios Tsolakoglou had tried to negotiate an armistice with the Germans. After the 
fall of Crete he was to become the head of a collaborationist government. It did not 
take long before Greece was under a tripartite German, Italian and Bulgarian 
occupation. 
 
Financially Greece was not prepared for the increased expenses related to military 
preparations that were rendered necessary as the war in Europe intensified. The 
financial burden, which was met with a war lottery, increased taxation, and British 
loans without specific terms of repayment, would come to dominate and define the 
Greek economy for years to come. 108  During the tripartite occupation Greece 
experienced food shortages and massive inflation, and suffering under the harsh 
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policies of the occupying powers, Greece underwent a devastating famine in the 
winter of 1941–2, which resulted in the deaths of 100,000 people.109 
 
Greek resistance 
The Greeks were not, however, without the will to resist. The Greek Communist Party 
(KKE) was soon to become the leading force in Greek resistance towards the 
occupying forces. In September 1941, the National Liberation Front (EAM) was 
established to organise the resistance, and the Greek People’s Liberation Army 
(ELAS) 110  was established as its military arm. EAM also established National 
Solidarity, an organisation for relief of victims of the occupation, and a youth 
movement known as EPON. According to Richard Clogg, the traditional ‘political 
world’ was unwilling at the time to offer leadership because of a political void that 
had developed during the dictatorship.111 The Communists were quick to fill this 
vacuum. Even so, it is worth noting that the majority of the members of EAM and 
ELAS were not communists, and non-communist resistance groups, like Ethnikos 
Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos (the National Democratic Hellenic League, 
EDES), were also established. EAM provided substantial help to the Greek population 
during the above-mentioned famine of 1941–2. 
 
The quisling government of General Tsolakoglou has been described as the puppet, 
first of Italy and then of Germany, but the war was soon to turn in favour of the 
Allies.112 In April 1943, Ioannis Rallis assumed the office of prime minister, and his 
establishment of the ‘Security Battalions’, led by Venizelist officers, soon turned into 
a counterattack against the resistance of EAM–ELAS. Many of the previously leading 
politicians, as well as Britain, were determined to keep Greece out of the hands of the 
Communists, and the ‘Security Battalion’ did not only consist of collaborators, but 
also of those who feared the power of the communists. 
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Armed bands of both communists and non-communists had taken to the mountains 
and started a guerrilla war against the occupying power. Britain wished to coordinate 
the Greek opposition, but met resistance because of Churchill’s support for the return 
of the king. As should be remembered, the king had supported Britain at the start of 
the war. The ‘National Bands’ agreement in July 1943 created a joint general 
headquarters in which EAM–ELAS enjoyed a majority in numbers. Even so, there did 
not seem to be much agreement between the guerrilla, the British military and 
political authorities, the king and the government in exile. The guerrilla wished to stay 
in control of Greece, and wanted to exercise power over a number of key ministries in 
the exile government. They also wished that the king would stay in exile until a 
plebiscite had voted for his return. In October, ELAS attacked the anti-communist 
organisation EDES on suspicion of collaboration with the occupying powers. The 
warring resistance groups finally managed to enter a truce in February 1944. EAM 
then established a Political Committee of National Liberation with the purpose of 
exercising government over what was considered the free ‘Mountain’ Greece. This 
resulted in mutinies of EAM sympathisers in the Greek armed forces that were 
stationed with the exiled government in Egypt. 
 
As in many of the significant events in the history of modern Greece, it was the Great 
Powers that came to decide the fate of the nation towards the end of the war. The 
famous ‘percentages agreement’ between Stalin and Churchill in October 1944 gave 
Britain 90 per cent of the say in post-war Greece, in return for Russian predominance 
in Romania. 
 
The Greek Civil War 
Georgios Papandreou was installed as the new prime minister of the exiled 
government in 1944. As a known Venizelist and anti-communist, he was greatly 
favoured by the British, and with their support, he took it upon himself to create a 
government of national unity at a conference in Lebanon. The conference ended in 
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deadlock because of an under-representation of the communists, who demanded the 
resignation of Papandreou and the control of key ministries as the price for their 
participation in the government. In August, however, EAM chose to back down. 
 
The Greece that Papandreou returned to in October 1944 was a Greece marked by 
years of war and occupation, and can perhaps best be described with the words of 
Mark Mazower: 
 
A few days after the Germans left, in late 1944, an American OSS agent drove across the 
Peloponnese, filming whatever he found. In contrast with the waving, jubilant crowds who 
greeted Allied troops in France, the people he met in Greece seemed tense and exhausted. The 
clothes hung off their bodies, and many were barefoot. Everywhere he found signs of 
malnutrition, disease and destruction. [...] Perhaps the eeriest sequence shows a small town in 
the mountains. […] A line of women, dressed in black, can be seen moving slowly down a 
road shaded by cypresses. From the cameraman’s notes, we find that this was Kalvryta, in the 
northern Peloponnese, almost exactly one year after all the men in the town had been shot by 
Wehrmacht soldiers.113 
 
Upon arrival, Papandreou had three main problems. First, he had to find a way to 
satisfy the left’s need for justice for the collaborationists. Second, he had to stabilise 
an economy starting of decay. And third, he had to demobilise and replace the 
guerrilla armies with a national army. As has been seen in other nations torn by war, 
victory requires justice and scapegoats. The Germans were leaving, but the fight 
between EAM–ELAS and the Security Battalion continued. There are also reports of 
massacres. Koliopoulos and Veremis writes: 
 
Between September 8 and 15 [1944] wholesale massacres of units accused of collaboration 
with the Germans took place in the Peleponnese. In Meligala, a village close to Kalamata, 
EAM-ELAS forces allegedly executed about 1,800 people.114 
 
                                            
113 Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece. The Experience of Occupation, 1941-44, New 
Haven/London: Yale Nota Bene/Yale University Press, 1993:xii. 
114 Koliopoulos & Veremis 2010:114. 
47 
  
At the time, the ELAS forces amounted to some 60,000 men and women, and though 
under British control, they constituted a significant threat to the new government. 
Even though an agreement seemed to have been made for demobilisation, the civil 
war within the resistance had created an atmosphere of suspicion, and ELAS soon 
feared that Papandreou would not hold his part of the agreement. EAM’s nominees 
soon resigned from the cabinet and organised mass demonstrations that resulted in the 
loss of fifteen lives.115 The Battle of Athens ended with British intervention in January 
1945. Though ELAS now agreed to disarm, the left-wing terror against political 
opponents during the years of occupation was not forgotten, and the uproar in 
December had stirred ultra-right-wingers who were now set on a brutal revenge on the 
left. 
 
Churchill managed to persuade King George II to stand down in favour of Archbishop 
Damaskinos, and General Plastiras replaced Papandreou as prime minister, but was 
soon replaced again by Themistoklis Sophoulis, who announced that the first election 
since 1936 was to be held the 31st of March 1946 and followed by a plebiscite. The 
Greek state was in disorder, and many on the left decided to abstain from the election. 
This resulted in victory for a right-wing coalition dominated by the People’s Party and 
headed by Konstantinos ‘Dino’ Tsaldaris with 55 per cent of the popular vote.116 The 
right-wing populists and their allies won 206 out of the 354 seats in parliament.117 The 
following plebiscite in September 1946 resulted in a 68 per cent vote for the return of 
the king.118 The right-wing government stood in opposition to the communists that 
were driven as guerrillas up into the mountains. In October the communists 
announced the establishment of the Democratic Army. 
 
In 1947, President Truman wanted to provide Greece with emergency aid through the 
Truman Doctrine. Britain had by then decided to loosen its grip on Greek politics and 
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instead leave affairs in the hands of the United States. Greece was at the time deeply 
involved in a civil war between the Democratic Army and the regular army. The KKE 
was banned in December, but the Democratic Army received significant support from 
the communist regimes of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania, and at the end of 1947 
they announced the formation of the Provisional Democratic Government. However, 
they stood against a national army supported by the United States, and though the 
Democratic Army managed to effectively recruit new troops in the areas they 
controlled, it proved not to be enough. In 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the 
Communist Information Bureau (COMINFORM), among other things because of 
their criticism of Russia’s failure to support the fighting Greek communists in the civil 
war.119 Despite this show of Yugoslavian support, the Greek communists decided to 
side with Moscow in the matter. This resulted in the loss of support from Yugoslavia, 
and in 1949, the Yugoslavian border was completely closed off to the Democratic 
Army. Eventually, the Army was forced deep into Albania by the US trained regular 
army, and by the end of 1949; the civil war was officially over. 
 
Many have tried to interpret the intentions of the leaders on both left and right as the 
nation slid into civil war. The KKE had been in charge for most of the occupation, and 
it is not unlikely that they had trouble giving that power away upon Prime Minister 
Papandreou’s return in 1944. Initial motives have also been discussed. David Close 
has highlighted mistrust as the driving force behind KKE’s decisions.120 The Battle of 
Athens in December 1944 had turned in the communists’ disfavour, and resulted in a 
retaliatory attitude among many right-wing populists. This was also to play a role in 
the politics of Prime Minister Konstantinos Tsaldaris during the civil war, and also at 
the end of the war when at least 5,000 guerrillas were executed upon their capture.121 
 
It has already been mentioned that during the war, EAM–ELAS recruited heavily both 
from non-communist and communist sympathisers. Though not directly a 
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continuation of EAM–ELAS, the Democratic Army also recruited people with 
different motivations. In fact, the majority of the members in 1947 and 1948 were 
Slav Macedonians, and Yugoslavian archives and papers from the KKE have shown 
that many within the Democratic Army had nationalist and secessionist ambitions for 
a separate Macedonian state with Thessaloniki as its capital.122 
 
Greek nationalism and the Megali Idea, 1821-1949 
 
Nationalism and identity 
One of the leading historians in the early days of modern Greece was Konstantinos 
Paparrigopoulos (1815-91). In his life’s work, History of the Hellenic Nation, he 
pointed to the fact that none of the European nations had ever in history been 
ethnically pure. Instead he argued that despite the Greeks being a young people, and 
therefore unable to claim a racial continuity, there is a cultural continuity of the 
Greeks.123 This was highlighted after the creation of the Greek state and the choice of 
Athens as the capital of the kingdom in 1834. Though at the time only a dusty village, 
the village that housed the ruins of the Parthenon was to become a symbol of the 
kingdom’s orientation towards its cultural heritage from the classical era. 
 
The modern Greek identity defined the Greek nation as ‘a cultural community 
embracing all the linguistic groups that the Greeks have incorporated and absorbed in 
their history.’124 Even so, one cannot exaggerate the role of the language as a major 
instrument of acculturation into Greek citizenship. As Koliopoulos and Veremis write, 
‘[t]he role of the modern state with its uniform educational system has been 
paramount in shaping national identity and national consciousness.’125 Katharevousa 
(which literally means ‘pure’), a more conservative version of Greek resembling the 
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old Greek, was soon to become the main language at the university of Athens, and 
was also the taught language in the general education system. Katharevousa was 
created as a compromise between ancient Greek and the spoken Dimotiki, or Demotic 
Greek. Modern Greek was transformed through a gradual adaption of more oral and 
modern terms, into the formal Katharevousa. The question of language would be a 
recurring theme until Andreas Papandreou in 1981 abolished the use of Katharevousa 
entirely. Today it is usually only used by the Greek-Orthodox church. 
 
The Megali Idea 
Modern Greece is built upon nationalistic projects, with the perhaps most important 
one being the Megali Idea. The Megali Idea, or Great Idea, governed Greek politics 
throughout the 19th century, and were not abandoned until well into the 20th century. 
As an expansionist project, the main goal was to incorporate all the areas which 
historically belonged Greece, going back to Alexander the Great. Benedict Anderson 
has tried to capture these strong nationalist sentiments in Greece. In his work 
Imagined Communities he writes about how the increase in discovery and conquest 
led to a revolution in European ideas about language. 126  This ‘lexicographic 
revolution’ led scholars to search beyond their own borders. During the 18th century, 
German, French and English scholars began to make the Greek classics available to a 
larger public, and stories of the ancient Hellenic civilisation were made increasingly 
accessible to ‘a small number of young Greek-speaking Christian Intellectuals’ who 
had studied or travelled ‘beyond the confines of the Ottoman Empire.’127 One of these 
men, Adamantios Koraes, also known as the father of Katharevousa, says: 
 
For the first time the nation surveys the hideous spectacle of its ignorance and trembles in 
measuring with the eye the distance separating it from its ancestors’ glorious past. This 
painful discovery, however, does not precipitate the Greeks into despair: We are the 
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descendants of Greeks, they implicitly told themselves, we must either try to become again 
worthy of this name, or we must not bear it.128 
 
According to Anderson, these young men strived to ‘debarbarise’ the modern Greeks, 
making them worthy of Socrates and Pericles. The movements resulted in the Greek 
War of Independence, but it did not end there. The Megali Idea has continued to lead 
to severe tension between Greece and its neighbouring countries up until this day. It 
may also explain the later tension that occurred regarding the name of Macedonia, 
when this northern neighbour of Greece became independent upon the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia in 1991. I will return to this in Chapter 5.  
 
Cleavages in politics 
It is not possible to understand the more recent developments in Greece without 
understanding the period between 1821 and 1949. The first long century of Greece as 
an independent state was dominated by war and severe political cleavages. The first 
cleavage was between royalists and republicans. This went on for several years, with 
intermittent periods of restoration of the kingdom between dictatorship and republic. 
This divide officially ended with the final abolition of the monarchy in 1973. The 
second cleavage was between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists. Even to this day, 
Eleftherios Venizelos is considered one of the most influential men in modern Greek 
history. This divide was soon to be supplanted by a third cleavage, between the 
communists and the military. This cleavage is perhaps one of the best examples of 
how Greek politics has been dominated by a strong polarisation and contrasting 
policies. There are two things that highlight this phenomenon. The first is the strong 
connection between the military and the political right. The second is the increase in 
the establishment of parties to the left. These two contrast each other in the sense that 
as one increases, so too does the other.  
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Inspired by the ideals of the French revolution, the 19th century had seen the creation 
of many nation-states and revolutions, and in the years that followed the establishment 
of the Greek state there was also a significant change in Greek nationalism. As 
previously mentioned, the building of both the Greek nation and the Greek nationality 
were key aspects during the period from independence to the civil wars, and the 
struggle to define who belonged to the Greek state would come to influence the next 
sixty years as well. As we have seen, the Greek state is built upon nationalist projects, 
and it is these projects that echo in the developments that followed in the last half of 
the 20th century.  
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4 1949–1990: European Integration 
 
1949–1974: Reconstruction and coup d’état 
 
Foreign relations and the case of Cyprus 
The period after the end of the civil war in 1949 was greatly marked by the American 
presence. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan had provided Greece with 
emergency aid since 1947. Economic reconstruction was to be the priority for years to 
come. Around half of the state’s investment expenditure was based on American aid 
between 1947 and 1957.129 To counter inflation, the drachma was devalued in 1953; a 
measure that again made Greece competitive in foreign markets.130 
 
To the north, Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had fallen under communist control. 
To stop further communist advancement to the south, both Greece and Turkey were 
admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1952. Though neither 
of the countries could be considered ‘North Altlantic’, the civil war in Greece and the 
fight between communists and anti-communists may be seen as a part of the Cold 
War. 
 
The island of Cyprus was also to shape the politics of this period. The case of Cyprus 
can be seen as a symbol of the difficult relationship between Greece and its neighbour 
Turkey that persists to this day. The island came under British administration in 1878 
and was made part of the crown colonies in 1925. The island’s population was mainly 
Greeks and Turks, with the Greeks making up the majority. The Greek community 
had for a long time expressed wishes for a reunification with their Greek motherland, 
but now the Greek Cypriot aspirations became clearer. In 1955 a campaign of civil 
disobedience was unleashed, backed up by political violence. The Turks countered 
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with demands for partition. In 1958, the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, 
made it clear that he considered pushing for Cypriot independence instead of 
unification with mainland Greece. Eventually, a settlement was reached between 
Greece, Turkey and Britain providing Cyprus with her independence as a republic 
within the British Commonwealth. Britain was still allowed to keep dominion over 
two areas, the military bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, and both Greece and Turkey 
were allowed to station a small military presence on the island. But the Cyprus 
settlement of 1960 proved to be short-lived. Some claimed that the system of power-
sharing had granted the Turkish minority too much power. In November 1963 
Archbishop Makarios demanded, on behalf of the Greek Cypriots, that this power be 
reduced. This was rejected by the Turkish government, and at the end of December 
fierce fighting between the populations on the island made Turkey threaten to 
intervene. In the end it was the subtle threats of American President Lyndon B. 
Johnson that put an end to the hostilities.131 A United Nation peacekeeping force was 
set in to maintain the peace, and at the time of writing, it still has not left. 
 
From reconstruction to revolution 
The post-war period saw an increase in the involvement of different parties in national 
politics. Martial law was in force between 1947 and 1950, so the first election after the 
civil war therefore took place in 1950 under a system of proportional representation. 
This is one of the first elections in which it became clear that it was personalities 
rather than principles that seemed to count for the voters. As I will later argue, this is 
both a permanent and a prominent feature of Greek politics even to this day.  
 
Going back to the elections of 1950, parties that identified themselves at the political 
centre won a significant number of the seats in a parliament of 250. The Liberal Party, 
led by Sofoklis Venizelos, the second son of Eleftherios Venizelos, won 56 seats; the 
new National Progressive Centre Union (EPEK), led by Nikolaos Plastiras, won 45 
seats; and the Georgios Papandreou Party won 35 seats. The Communists had been 
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banned since 1947, but were represented through the Democratic Front, which won 18 
seats, whereas the populist People’s Party, still under the leadership of Konstantinos 
Tsaldaris, remained the largest party with 62 seats.132 
 
The government did not last long and new elections were held a year later. The 
election of September 1951 saw the debut of two new fractions: the Greek Rally, 
headed by Marshal Papagos, who had been commander-in-chief at the end of the civil 
war, and the United Democratic Left, closely associated with the banned KKE. The 
Greek Rally replaced the People’s Party on the right, with a significant proportion of 
the army vote, but inconclusive results still led to a new centre coalition, to the dismay 
of the American ambassador, who threatened to reduce American financial aid unless 
elections were held under a majority system.133 This was done in the election of 
November 1952, which resulted in a major victory for the Greek Rally, which secured 
247 out of 300 seats with 49 per cent of the vote.134 
 
After the death of Marshal Papagos, King Paul, the brother of George II who had 
succeeded him upon his death in 1947, chose Konstantinos Karamanlis as his 
successor. Karamanlis changed the Greek Rally into the National Radical Union and 
held a new election in February 1956. Karamanlis’ party won a majority in the 
parliament, but in the election of 1958 the front organisation of the banned 
Communist party, United Democratic Left, emerged as the main opposition party. 
Again the political stage seemed marked by the fight between communists and anti-
communists. Some have suggested that this sudden rise in the popular vote for the left 
was due to problems at the centre.135 Whether this was the case or not, the centre made 
sure of their comeback in the election in 1961. 
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After the election of 1958, the centre parties had joined forces and created the Centre 
Union, headed by Georgios Papandreou. Papandreou’s coalition succeeded in creating 
an alternative to the United Democratic Left, and the supporters of the Centre Union 
ranged from the far right to the far left. In spite of this, Karamanlis and the National 
Radical Union still came out as the victors of the 1961 elections. Both the Centre 
Union and the United Democratic Left maintained that the results were manipulated 
and claimed that people had felt pressured by the army or other forces. Furthermore, 
they accused the army for having implemented a NATO plan, code-named ‘Pericles’, 
and said it was designed to deal with internal security threats and to strengthen the 
hold of power of the right.136 Though never proved at the time, the Pericles plan was 
to become important in the later colonels’ coup.137 
 
In 1963, Georgios Papandreou managed to secure a narrow victory over Karamanlis, 
who was struggling after a fallout with the royal house. Karamanlis had in fact 
resigned and left the country to a caretaker government, and returned only to 
participate in the elections. Though victorious, Papandreou’s suspicion towards the 
United Democratic Left, who now held the balance of power in government, made 
him resign. New elections were therefore held in February 1964, this time benefitting 
Papandreou and the centre, which gained a 53 per cent share of the vote.138 
 
Papandreou’s time in office was to be short, though, and overshadowed by the 
troubles on the island of Cyprus and of economic development. He relied heavily on 
the advice of his son, Andreas, who was more radical than his father.139 In 1965, 
Papandreou went to the new king, Konstantinos II, who had ascended the throne after 
the death of his father, King Paul, in 1964, and asked to be given greater control over 
the army and the ministry of defence. He was rejected on the grounds that his son was 
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under investigation, accused of being involved with a conspiratorial group within the 
army, known as Aspida, or Shield. Instead King Konstantinos II sacked the prime 
minister on the 15th of July 1965. Little did the king know of the consequences of his 
actions. Tension ran high in the population and supporters of Papandreou took to the 
streets in massive protests. 
 
In 1966, Papandreou and the leader of the National Radical Union, Panayiotis 
Kanellopoulos, reached an agreement with the king with the purpose of trying to 
stabilise the government. They agreed that new elections in May 1967 were the best 
solution to this political crisis. Richard Clogg describes the tension at the time in the 
following words: ‘[T]he continuing political turmoil and uncertainty served to feed the 
paranoia of the extra-parliamentary right and to create a dangerous climate of 
disillusionment with politicians among the population at large.’140 This uncertain and 
disillusioned climate is perhaps what best explains what happened next. 
 
Coup d’état: The military Junta 
Out of fear of a new victory for Papandreou, the military, led by a group of colonels, 
decided to stop the elections and successfully staged a coup on the 21st of April 1967. 
The three engineers of the coup were Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, Nikolaos 
Makarezos and Stylianos Pattakos. For many years, Papadopoulos’ main 
preoccupation was to ensure that control of the state remained out of the hands of 
communists. As many officers of the army had lost confidence in the crown, plans 
were made for a takeover. The conspirators approached the king and asked him to 
appoint a puppet government, leaving the power in the hands of Papadopoulos. Over 
the following weeks thousands of people were put under house arrest, jailed or 
deported to prison islands. Many prominent politicians were also arrested.141 
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The regime of the colonels, or just Junta (Greek: Χούντα), as the dictatorship was to 
be called, was set on revenge. Many have discussed why the Junta wished to take 
over, and though explanations range from defending ‘the traditional values of 
“Helleno-Christian civilisation” from the western and secular influences’ 142  to 
displeasure with the result of the civil war143, it is clear that the coup was carried out 
under the pretence of an imminent communist takeover, similar to what had been done 
under the regime of Metaxas some 30 years earlier. The Junta soon took up the 
ambitious programme of rejuvenating Greece, creating a utopia where ‘social classes 
would be abolished and general consensus on vital issues would be arrived at through 
systematic training in whatever was deemed expedient for the nation.’144  Their 
ideology was not unlike that of other far right regimes, and it could perhaps best be 
described as a sort of self-taught fascism. 
 
The Junta was highly unpopular, and its support base was fragile. In fact, the majority 
of politicians at both ends of the spectre, with the exception of the extreme right, 
opposed the regime. Despite this, there was little organised opposition within Greek 
borders, at least until the regime started to deteriorate in 1973. In March, students 
occupied the Law Faculty of the University of Athens. Papadopoulos’ response was to 
dethrone King Konstantinos II, who had lived in exile in Rome, and in his place he 
proclaimed a presidential parliamentary republic. In the referendum that followed, 
Papadopoulos, as the only candidate, was elected president for an eight-year term. 
Again the students took to the streets, and in November they managed to occupy the 
university institution known as Athens Polytechnic. However, these actions were 
brutally supressed by the army, and the occupation ended after two days, on the 17th 
of November 1973, when a tank crashed through the main gate. Possibly as many as 
7,000 people were arrested and hundreds were wounded. It has not been possible to 
ascertain the total number of deaths, but it could be close to 80.145 His own supporters 
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replaced Papadopoulos soon after as Dimitrios Ioannidis assumed leadership, with 
Lieutenant-General Phaidon Gizikis as president. 
 
In the end, the lack of support and legitimacy of the Ioannidis regime led to the 
downfall of the Junta, and Konstantinos Karamanlis was brought back to oversee the 
return to democratic government, assuming the office of prime minister on the 24th of 
July 1974. 
 
1975–1990: The Metapolitefsi and two-party politics 
 
Rebuilding democracy 
In Greece, the rebuilding of society after the overthrow of the Junta is referred to as 
the Metapolitefsi (Greek: Μεταπολίτευση), literally meaning ‘regime change’. Many 
have written about this period and the sudden transformation from military 
dictatorship to being one of the more stable democracies in Europe at the beginning of 
the 1980s.146 As we have seen, the political system in Greece had for a long time been 
dominated by cleavages between royalists and republicans, Venizelists and anti-
Venizelists, and between communists and anti-communists. It was only at the end of 
the Second World War that one heard talk of the establishment of a political centre as 
an addition to the traditional left and right. Most of the parties were created out of a 
will for political or cultural change, and not out of a general ‘need’ in the population. 
According to Ole Smith, the role of the politician has been that of a messenger 
between the population and the bureaucracy who should in principle be able to 
provide for his supporters whether they were in need of a phone or a pension.147 
Personal issues were therefore essential as the Greeks entered the election booths 
where they usually voted for personalities rather than specific issues, a tendency 
already noticeable in other elections following the civil war. The system resembled 
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the old patron-client relationship, where support in the elections obliged a politician to 
help his elector if asked. 
 
New Democracy vs. PASOK 
Konstantinos Karamanlis wanted to legitimise his sudden power as soon as possible, 
and therefore called for elections in November 1974. Before this election, there were 
three primary issues that concerned the electorate: establishing a democracy; 
terminating the dependence on foreign, and of late American, aid in foreign affairs; 
and greater social justice.148 There are also two other things that should be noted about 
this election. First of all, the election featured parties from the full political spectrum. 
Karamanlis had even used the increasing tolerance in the population after the 
overthrow of the Junta to remove the ban on the Communist Party. Second, two 
parties emerged for the election that would play a significant part in Greek politics for 
the decades to come. The first was Karamanlis’ newly established New Democracy 
(ND), a recreation of the previous National Radical Union. The second was the 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), the party of Andreas Papandreou. Not to 
anyone’s surprise, New Democracy gained the majority with 54 per cent, translated 
into 219 out of 300 seats in Parliament.149 The following referendum on the future of 
the monarchy resulted in a close to 70–30 margin in favour of a republic, and in 1975 
the Parliament elected Konstantinos Tsatsos as president.150 
 
New Democracy was to keep the majority of the popular vote after the parliamentary 
elections of 1977, though it had decreased from the last election. In 1980, Karamanlis 
was chosen to succeed Tsatsos as president, thereby leaving the office of prime 
minister to George Rallis. Karamanlis had for a long time worked to strengthen 
Greece’s bonds with Europe. In 1961, Prime Minister Karamanlis successfully 
managed to negotiate an association agreement with the European Economic 
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Community. Twenty years later, in 1981, Greece became the tenth member of the 
European Community (EU). 
 
Both organisation and democratisation proved to be important for parties if they were 
to retain their positions. Papandreou seemed well aware of this, and worked hard to 
establish a softer line, trying to appeal to voters from the centre and the more radical 
voters in New Democracy. Promoting the slogan Allagi (change), PASOK appealed 
evenly to both men and women, to both rural and urban areas, and it cut across social 
classes.151 ND, on the other hand, had relied too much on Karamanlis, who was 
unable to carry out the reforms necessary to modernise his party. The leadership of 
ND was therefore given to George Rallis, but the absence of Karamanlis’ charismatic 
leadership weakened the party. The many years of persecution of the left, and 
especially of communists, had created a fear of the police, but with the policies of 
Karamanlis this fear had now gradually started to decrease. The removal of the ban on 
KKE made the left a more prominent force in Greek politics. In the elections of 1981 
PASOK won 172 out of 300 seats, yielding the first socialist government, and 
Andreas Papandreou became prime minister. 
 
The elections of 1985 were preceded by the end of Karamanlis’ period as president in 
March. It was generally assumed that he would continue for a second term, but despite 
having previously praised Karamanlis’ role as president, Papandreou now went 
against him as PASOK launched the candidacy of the younger Christos Sartzetakis 
instead. After three rounds of voting, Sartzetakis finally received the necessary 
minimum of 180 votes in parliament. 152  PASOK then introduced constitutional 
amendments that enhanced the powers of the prime minister in relation to those of the 
president. The parliamentary elections later that year therefore turned into a 
confrontation between ND and PASOK, but PASOK retained approximately the same 
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majority as it had in the elections of 1981 with 46 per cent, whereas ND increased its 
share of the vote by five percentage points, gaining 41 per cent of the vote.153 
 
The year of 1989 saw two elections, both ending in a deadlock. The leader of ND was 
now Konstantinos Mitsotakis, who had made a mark for himself in Greek politics as 
the rival of Papandreou. Papandreou quickly accused him of being a traitor who, 
amongst other things, bore a major responsibility for the Junta.154 The popularity of 
Papandreou was suddenly falling in the run-up to the elections. Papandreou had health 
issues and spent some time in hospitals abroad. He also decided to divorce his wife to 
marry a significantly younger Olympic Airways hostess. As Papandreou came to 
realise that PASOK would probably decrease its popular vote in the elections, he 
made sure to introduce a more purely proportional electoral system as one of his last 
acts in government. The effect of this was seen in the June elections of 1989 where the 
majority of 44 per cent of the vote only resulted in 144 seats in Parliament for New 
Democracy, whereas PASOK won 39 per cent and 125 seats. The ‘Alliance of the 
Left and of Progress’, an alliance between the Communist Party and the Greek Left, 
gained 13 per cent, and therefore held the balance of power.155 New elections did not 
provide a significant change in the results. The inability to come to terms and establish 
a coalition government made new elections seem inevitable. After long negotiations, 
an all-party government was formed headed by a non-political figure, Xenophon 
Zolotas. This ‘ecumenical’ government was to remain in office until new elections 
could be held in April 1990. In this election ND emerged as the winner with 47 per 
cent and 150 seats in Parliament, with Konstantinos Mitsotakis becoming prime 
minister.156 A month later, Konstantinos Karamanlis was elected president for a 
second term. 
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Cyprus towards the new millenium 
The 1980s saw significant changes, and a greater Greek presence, in international 
affairs. In 1983, two years after her accession, Greece took over the presidency of the 
EU. The 1980s also saw a reduction of the US military presence in Greece. As for 
Cyprus, the situation had become increasingly tense just as the Junta had started to 
disintegrate. The Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios demanded the removal of 
Greek troops from the island after Ioannidis tried to force Makarios to accept Athens 
as the national centre of Hellenism. Ioannidis responded by launching a coup against 
the president. This resulted in a Turkish response in the form of an invasion of the 
northern part of the island in 1974. War was imminent between the two neighbours as 
both started to mobilise. This became the first crisis in Karamanlis’ new term in 
office. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriot assembly unilaterally declared an independent 
‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’. Though formally only recognised by Turkey, 
the incident worsened the relationship between Greece and Turkey. The partition of 
Cyprus had created two independent states, and clashes occurred frequently between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots during the 1990s, and the division remains to this day. 
The Greek part of Cyprus became a member of the EU in 2004. 
 
The Greek electoral system 
Before further assessing the developments from 1990 to 2014 a note should be made 
on the Greek electoral system. Generally it is the sitting majority party that call for 
elections and also chooses what electoral system should be used. The custom has been 
to vary between a majority system and a system of proportional representation, 
usually depending on what would most benefit the incumbent majority. An example 
of how the electoral law could be used to the governing party’s advantage is the 
election of 1956. Here the electoral law created a system that gave Karamanlis’ party 
the majority in the parliament, even though the opposition received a marginally 
larger share of the popular vote. 
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Recently, the most common electoral system used in Greece has been a combination 
of a majority system and a system of proportional representation. After parliamentary 
elections, the parties that wish to form a coalition need to hold half of the seats in 
parliament plus one, or 151 out of 300 seats. The seats are distributed in the following 
manner: 250 of the seats are distributed on the basis of proportional representation. 
The last 50 are given to the party that wins the plurality of the votes. This system 
helps create a system where ‘the winner takes it all’. There is also a 3 per cent 
threshold for parties to be considered in the race for seats. 
 
The Greek electoral system has long suffered from high levels of corruption, populism 
and also, as I suggested earlier, clientelism. As the new millennium approached, the 
fear of the police again became a prominent feature in the population. In 2008, the 
police shot and killed a 15-year-old boy. The incident and the youth riots that 
followed not only support the claim that there was a scepticism towards the police as 
figures of authority, but also the imminent political crisis. There was a call for radical 
political change, and whether this change was offered from the right or from the left 
was not a matter of great importance.157 
                                            
157 See also Ellinas 2012. 
65 
  
5 1990–2014: The Financial Crisis  
 
Greece entered the European Community (EU) in 1981. This was despite the fact that 
a Commission report from 1976/7 had clearly stated that Greece was absolutely not 
prepared economically for such a commitment.158 The decision to grant Greece 
membership should rather be seen as purely political. The main motivation for the 
Community to accept Greek accession was to help stabilise and consolidate the 
emerging democracy after a period of ‘right-wing dictatorship’.159 The same could be 
seen in other new member states, such as Spain and Portugal that became members in 
1986, and it was also later repeated, though less hastily, in Eastern Europe. Greece 
had long sought to maintain a stronger bond with the European states. This can 
perhaps be seen as a withdrawal towards the north and west after a long time under 
the shadow of the Ottoman Empire to the south and east.  
 
The question of Macedonia 
Greek foreign affairs during the last decade of the 20th century were also marked by 
the unstable states at the northern border, Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Albania 
had a large Greek minority in the south. A sudden exodus in 1991 gave rise to fears 
that the Albanian government was forcing the minority to leave, but at the same time, 
large groups of Albanians who were not of Greek origin also crossed the border to the 
south to find work in Greece, most of them illegally. The borders of the Soviet Union 
had been closed for years, and now Greece also saw a significant increase in 
immigration of Greek minorities from the former Union. Macedonia also achieved its 
independence with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and EU members soon opened 
diplomatic relations with the new state. This was met by fury in Greece, as I briefly 
noted in chapter 3. Greece refused to accept a name that did not include a reference to 
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its previous union. The name Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 
was therefore decided upon as this separated this newly established republic from the 
old claim Greece had over the name and geographical area of the historical Macedonia 
of Alexander the Great. For the same reason, Greece has greatly opposed Macedonian 
membership in the European Union. The Macedonian demonstrations are also 
mentioned by Dimitris Psarras as a factor for the increase in support for the far right in 
the 1990s.160 
 
In February 1994, Papandreou announced a blockade of Macedonia. Interpreting this 
as a breach with the laws of the community, the EU Commission complained to the 
European Court of Justice. The issue reached its peak in 1995, when the Greek foreign 
minister refused to attend the ceremony to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the 
liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp, because the Macedonian flag was to 
be flown alongside the flags of other countries that also lost nationals in the death 
camp.161  Relations improved in 1995, and Greece eventually agreed to lift the 
blockade. 
 
New leadership in PASOK 
A split between Prime Minister Mitsotakis and his first foreign minister, Antonis 
Samaras, over Macedonia in 1992 led to the dismissal of Samaras and the collapse of 
the short-lived ND government. As a response, Samaras founded his own party, 
Political Spring, and in the elections of 1993 he received 5 per cent of the vote and 
thereby secured 10 seats.162 PASOK, however, was to return as the victor once again, 
and Papandreou returned to power. Though critical of the austerity measures 
introduced by the president, Papandreou as prime minister gave his blessing to 
economic policies to cut the massive Greek debt and gain control over the inflation, 
all for the purpose of preparing for entrance in the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
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Kostis Stephanopoulos replaced Karamanlis as president in 1995 when the latter 
resigned after five years. Around the same time, Papandreou also resigned due to 
illness, and Kostas Simitis replaced him both as prime minister and later also as the 
head of PASOK. He took it upon himself to modernise the party and attempted to 
wipe out the major accusation of the party being populist. According to Simitis: 
 
Populism transfers the social problem from the plain of ideology to a level that does not 
disturb the status quo of social relations. The assistance of the state and the benefits derived 
from it is the sole objective of political struggles in Greece.163  
 
Again we are reminded of the previously mentioned patron-client relationship 
frequently in use in Greek politics. These relationships could be transferred across 
generations, and were also frequently used by politicians in the socialist PASOK.164 
At the election of 1996, PASOK secured 162 out of 300 seats and ND 108 seats, and 
there was an upsurge in the popularity of the left-wing parties, which won 15 per cent 
combined and 30 seats.165 
 
Kostas Simitis was to hold office for another two terms, throughout the election of 
2000 and up until his resignation in 2004. George Papandreou, the son of Andreas, 
then succeeded him as the leader of PASOK. The election of 2000 had again given 
PASOK a clear majority and a comfortable 158 seats. The KKE won 5 per cent of the 
vote and secured 11 seats, whereas the Coalition of the Left won 3 per cent and 6 
seats. New Democracy won 125 seats.166 
 
The decade also saw the death of two of the most prominent politicians in the post-
war era. Andreas Papandreou died after long-time illness in 1996, at the age of 
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seventy-seven, and Konstantinos Karamanlis followed close after, in 1998, at the age 
of ninety-one. 
 
The new millennium 
Not long after the election in 2000, a report from the US State Department ranked 
Greece as one of the countries in the world with the most anti-American terrorist 
attacks the preceding year. This was soon followed by the assassination of the British 
military attaché by the group ‘17 November’, a remnant of the end of the military 
Junta. This proved to be the last victim of the group, and ‘17 November’ was 
dismantled two years later and many of its members put on trial. As the Olympic 
Games were to be held in Athens in 2004, people started questioning Greece’s ability 
to provide sufficient security for the event.167 Though preparation for the Olympic 
Games greatly benefitted the infrastructure of the capital, with the new Eleftherios 
Venizelos Airport opening in 2001, it also proved to be very costly, reaching the sum 
of 9 billion euros.168 
 
Kostas Karamanlis, the nephew of the popular Konstantinos Karamanlis, now led 
New Democracy, and in the election of 2004, ND again defeated PASOK with a 
majority of 45 per cent of the popular vote. PASOK gained 41 per cent.169 For the 
election in 2007, there was a slight decrease in the vote for both PASOK and ND, but 
ND still held the majority. The election also saw the emergence of a new party, Laikos 
Orthodoxos Synagermos, or Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), which gained close to 4 
per cent and 10 seats.170 
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Greece joined the euro area as the twelfth member on the 1st of January 2001. In the 
early 1990s, the Maastricht Treaty was discussed and with it the creation of cohesion 
funds to assist those countries with a GDP lower than 90 per cent of the average for 
EU countries. This was intended to help states meet the European Monetary Union’s 
convergence criteria171, and mainly applied to the new member states, Greece and 
Portugal.172 One of the convergence criteria included a demand that the deficit be 
below 3 per cent. In November 2004, Greece admitted to having lied about its 
economy in order to be accepted into the euro area, and that Greece’s deficit level had 
not been around 3 per cent since 1999.173 
 
Towards the end of the first decade in the new millennium, the fear of the far right 
again became prominent. The incident with the police shooting of the 15-year-old boy 
in December 2008 reminded people of the Junta, and at the election of 2009, ND lost 
61 seats and fell down to 33 per cent of the vote. PASOK, on the other hand, gained 
58 seats with its 44 per cent translating into a total of 160 seats. KKE won 8 per cent, 
LAOS won 6 per cent, and a new party, the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) 
won 5 per cent and 13 seats.174 SYRIZA would become a prominent part of politics 
the following years. Kostas Karamanlis, the leader of ND, saw no other alternative but 
to step down after this crushing defeat, and was replaced by Antonis Samaras, the old 
foreign minister, who had left his own party, the right-wing Political Spring175, in 
favour of ND. 
 
The attention was soon to turn towards the global financial crisis of 2008. Greece had 
been accepted into the euro area in 2001, and the Greek currency, the drachma, was 
replaced by the euro in 2002. After years of debt and corruption, peaked by the 
expenses of the Olympics, Greece was headed into recession. Membership in the euro 
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area made a devaluation of its currency impossible, and the only solution seemed to be 
internal devaluation and harsh austerity measures.  
 
The financial crisis 
From September 2008 the European financial crisis was a fact. At first, measures were 
taken by the Greek parliament to support the Greek banking system. Later, severe 
austerity measures were introduced. As for the rest of the international community, it 
took its time to respond to the crisis. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) did not 
launch the first report on the situation in Greece until the 6th of August 2009. Article 
IV of the report clearly stated that structural reforms and fiscal consolidations could 
no longer be postponed.176 Greece was highly vulnerable due to high debt levels and 
the erosion of competitiveness. 
 
The blossoming crisis also affected the elections. In the parliamentary elections on the 
4th of October 2009, PASOK won an absolute majority with 43.92 per cent of the 
vote, and formed a government with George Papandreou as the new prime minister. 
This also meant that Kostas Karamanlis of New Democracy was ousted after twelve 
years as president of the party. On the 14th of December 2009, Prime Minister 
Papandreou announced the government’s intention to reduce the fiscal deficit to 3 per 
cent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2013, from an estimated level of 12.7 per 
cent in November 2009. The prime minister also announced the first round of 
austerity measures and structural reforms. 
 
In January 2010, the Greek government launched an economic stability programme. 
The principal objective of this programme would be to reduce the fiscal deficit to 2.8 
per cent by 2012. During the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in 
January 2010, the European Union Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner 
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Joaquin Almunia did an interview with Bloomberg TV.177 In the video he spoke of the 
need for a fiscal adjustment, and that this was part of a plan A to save Greece. 
However, he also announced that there was no plan B. Because of the common 
currency, default was not an option in the euro area. 
 
In February 2010, the Greek government launched a harsh austerity programme, and 
the EU endorsed it the very next day.178 At an extraordinary Eurozone summit on the 
11th of February 2010, European leaders stated their commitment to support Greece 
through the crisis. Despite the support from the leaders of the euro area, the Greek 
finance minister stated in mid-February 2010 that Greece and the Greek economy 
were sinking like the ‘Titanic’.179 
 
In March the government unveiled a 4.8 billion euro austerity programme, but for all 
it was worth, it did not help Greece increase its credibility in the financial markets. 
Two days later the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, raised the possibility of 
‘ejecting’ countries from the euro area if they did not respect the rules.180 At the end 
of March 2010, the leaders of the euro area stated their intention to support Greece in 
order to safeguard the stability of the euro, and also to supply Greece with emergency 
funding in case Greece’s access to the financial markets was suspended.181 
 
Not until April 2010 did Prime Minister Papandreou see the need to make an official 
request for financial support.182 His request was answered on the 2nd of May when the 
leaders of the euro area and the IMF agreed to provide an emergency loan of 110 
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billion euros to Greece, on the condition that Greece would have to implement an 
austerity programme of 30 billion euros.183 The parliament agreed to the conditions of 
the first bailout with 172 out of 300 votes, but the result was met with violent 
demonstrations in Athens and ended in the loss of three lives.184 
 
Protests were again reported outside the Greek parliament in May 2011. There were 
also reported rumours at the time that members of the euro area were contemplating a 
possible Greek exit. In a cabinet reshuffle in June, Evangelos Venizelos was made the 
new finance minister.185 This was done just in time for the vote for the new austerity 
package measures that took place at the end of the month. Amidst violent 
demonstrations, which led to clashes between the police and protestors in front of the 
Greek parliament, the proposal still passed with 155 votes in favour and 136 
against.186 This was a somewhat surprising result, since the polls at the time suggested 
that between 70 and 80 per cent of the people were opposed to the austerity plan. In an 
interview done with BBC reporter Malcolm Brabant, a bank worker reportedly said: 
‘We know very well that these measures will be our tombstone […] They will have 
extreme consequences for workers and for everyone on all social levels.’187 
 
Unemployment levels continued to increase as yet another austerity bill passed 
through parliament in October. The bill also included a plan for a cutback of 30,000 
workers in the public sector.188 At least 70,000 people now joined the protests in front 
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of the parliament in Syntagma Square in Athens. 189  The anti-austerity protests 
continued through-out the month, and by the end, Prime Minister George Papandreou 
decided to call for a confidence vote and a referendum to approve a deal made by the 
euro summit for a new 130 billion euro loan to Greece.190 The news caused great 
turmoil, both nationally as well as internationally. Papandreou won the vote with 153 
votes in favour and 145 votes against, but was soon after summoned to the G20 
summit in Cannes, after which he revoked the referendum and resigned on the 6th of 
November.191 A few days later, Lukas Papademos, a non-partisan leader of a tripartite 
coalition government consisting of PASOK, ND and LAOS replaced him as prime 
minister.192 
 
On the 12th of February 2012, the Greek parliament approved the new loan agreement 
with a two-thirds majority. Again, the vote was met with major demonstrations and 
due to the use of Molotov cocktails, more than 40 buildings were set on fire in the 
Greek capital.193 The new austerity measures also led to LAOS leaving the coalition, 
leaving PASOK and ND in a bipartite government.194 In a public speech, president of 
the European Commission José Manuel Barroso spoke of the Eurogroup’s approval of 
the new agreement for a second financial assistance programme for Greece. Barroso 
finished by emphasising that ‘We [the Eurogroup] are committed to the future of the 
Euro.’195 
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The far right from 1974 to 2012 
As the financial crisis took its toll on the Greek economy, the far right used the crisis 
as a springboard towards further acknowledgement in the general population. The 
increase in number of immigrants in a struggling community was perhaps easy to 
identify and present as the scapegoats, along with the leading politicians. According to 
Vassiliki Georgiadou it was ‘characteristic of the Greek parliamentary democracy in 
this period that there was no room in the political arena for far-right politics’.196 
Instead the conservative ND absorbed the votes of many who considered themselves 
ultranationalist and pro-monarchists, as well as the old supporters of the Junta. An 
example is the absorption of National Alignment (Greek: Εθνική Παράταξις) in the 
early 1980s. 
 
New Democracy has also experienced the dominating cleavages in Greek politics. 
When the monarchy was finally abolished in 1974, an ultraconservative faction 
withdrew its support for New Democracy. As the only anti-communist, pro-
monarchist party with some significant electoral basis in the parliament next to ND 
after the end of the Junta, National Alignment was determined to punish ND for its 
neutrality on the fate of the monarchy in the elections of 1977.197 Towards the end of 
the 1970s, ND lost over half a million voters, mainly to the socialist PASOK, but also 
to National Alignment, which was slightly further to the right of ND. National 
Alignment was absorbed into ND when ND leaders, Konstantinos Karamanlis and 
Georgios Rallis, decided to use the following simple tactics: ‘In the 1981 
parliamentary elections they placed the number two from National Alignment third on 
their national electoral list and put MPs and activists of National Alignment on the 
party list.’198 
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Other far right parties after the end of the Junta include the short-lived Progressive 
Party (KP) and the more successful National Political Union (EPEN). EPEN emerged 
after the disintegration of National Alignment, and during the 1980s it was able to 
mobilise some influence among extreme right-wingers. EPEN was nostalgic about the 
military regime of the Junta and demanded the release of the imprisoned colonels; 
former dictator Georgios Papadopoulos was in fact considered the ‘spiritual leader’ of 
the party.199 As we shall see, EPEN was also to be the starting point of Nikos 
Michaloliakos’ political career.  
 
It took years before another right-wing party appeared on the political arena. People’s 
Orthodox Rally, shortened LAOS, the Greek word for ‘people’, entered the stage in 
the late 2000s, and won 3,8 per cent of the votes at the elections of 2007, and in so 
doing overcame the 3 per cent threshold and gained 10 members of parliament.200 
This was the first time that the far right had any significant presence in parliament 
since the beginning of the Metapolitefsi. 
 
A somewhat surprising turn of events was seen in November 2011 when PASOK and 
ND decided to create an interim coalition government under the leadership of Lukas 
Papademos. Despite having held a majority for years, the support for both parties had 
fallen, and there was a need to include another party to regain the majority. The 
question was whether Papademos should turn to the left or the right for support. He 
decided to invite LAOS, rather than SYRIZA or KKE due to the two latter parties’ 
strong opposition to his economic policies.201  
 
The general support for LAOS was, however, soon to decrease, at the same time that 
support for Golden Dawn increased (see table 1 below). Of course, it takes larger 
political surveys to prove that previous supporters of LAOS voted for Golden Dawn in 
the elections of 2012, and saying so is mere speculation on my part. LAOS still gained 
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two members of parliament in the European Parliament in 2009, as the only far right 
party in Greece. 
 
Intra-governmental crises and anti-racist measures: 
Recent developments 2012–2014 
 
Parliamentary elections 2012 
The year of 2012 again saw two parliamentary elections, one closely followed by the 
other. The elections would come to see the establishment of a political stage defined 
by multi-party rather than two-party politics. After the fall of the Junta in 1974, the 
political system in Greece has mostly been a two-party system dominated by PASOK 
and New Democracy. The communists have always played a part on the political 
scene, albeit a minor one after the civil war. Even so, in the elections of 2012 one 
should note the sudden rise in support for the radical left, here represented by 
SYRIZA. Though originally functioning as a coalition between left wing and radical 
left parties, as well as ecological parties, SYRIZA was founded before the elections in 
2004, in which the newly established party came in fourth with 3.26 per cent of the 
votes and 6 seats in parliament.202 Despite being in the minority in parliament, 
SYRIZA quickly gained support in the broader population. In the elections of 2007, 
their share of the votes had increased slightly to 5 per cent and a total of 14 seats.203 
They kept 13 of the seats after the elections of 2009, and also gained a seat in the 
European Parliament the same year.204 However, 4 of their MPs would come to leave 
the party in June 2010 to form the Democratic Left (DIMAR), which would come to 
be among the biggest parties in the following elections.205 
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SYRIZA was popular in front of the parliamentary elections in May 2012, and the 
results showed, what some characterised as a surprising turn of events as the party 
gained 16.78 per cent of the votes, pushing PASOK down to third with 13.18 per 
cent.206 SYRIZA’s results were to be further improved in the re-elections in June, with 
26.9 per cent giving them 71 seats in parliament.207  
 
As mentioned, PASOK’s results are surprising if one looks at the long-ruling two-
party politics that had been dominant in Greek politics since the 1970s. The New York 
Times interpreted the results of the election as ‘a rejection of the terms of the bailout 
[…] The elections were seen as pivotal, determining both the country’s future in 
Europe and its prospects for economic recovery.’ 208  The voters seemed to be 
punishing the leading parties, PASOK and ND, and instead showed their support for 
the parties that were opposed to both the existing government as well as the terms of 
the loan agreement offered to Greece. This included 8.48 per cent to the old KKE, 
6.11 per cent to the newly established DIMAR, but also a significant 10.60 per cent to 
the eurosceptic conservative party Independent Greeks (ANEL) and 6.97 per cent to 
Golden Dawn (see table 1 below).209 
 
New Democracy still won the elections, but with an all time low of only 18.85 per 
cent of the votes. Efforts to form a coalition government were unsuccessful, and new 
elections were called for approximately six weeks later, the 17th of June. This time, 
ND had strengthened their position and won 29.66 per cent of the vote. SYRIZA was 
not far behind with 26.9 per cent, but PASOK had sunk even further and only received 
12.3 per cent of the votes.210 The result was a tripartite coalition government by 
PASOK, ND and DIMAR, with ND’s Antonis Samaras as the new prime minister. 
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The result of the 2012 elections was a many-faceted government with parties ranging 
from the far left to the far right, including ‘neo-Nazis, Stalinists and Maoists together 
with radical, radical leftwingers, populist rightwingers and a numerous defenders of 
paranoid conspiracy theories’211– all parties with authoritarian features. Once again, 
the situation is not unlike the developments in Germany under the Weimar Republic, 
leading up to the dictatorship of Adolf Hitler.  
 
Table 1: Greek Election results 2000–2012: Percentage of votes and number of MPs. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
2012:	  17.6	   2012:	  6.5	   2009	   2007	   2004	   2000	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  
New	  Democracy	  
29.66	  %	   18.85	  %	   33.47	  %	   41.84	  %	   45.36	  %	   42.70	  %	  
	   	   129	   108	   91	   152	   166	   125	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
PASOK	  
12.28	  %	   13.18	  %	   43.92	  %	   38.10	  %	   40.55	  %	   43.80	  %	  
	   	   33	   41	   160	   102	   116	   158	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
SYRIZA	  
26.89	  %	   16.79	  %	   4.60	  %	   5.04	  %	   3.26	  %	   	  	  
	   	   71	   52	   13	   14	   6	   	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
KKE	  
4.50	  %	   8.48	  %	   7.54	  %	   8.15	  %	   5.90	  %	   5.53	  %	  
	   	   12	   26	   21	   22	   12	   11	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
DIMAR	  
6.25	  %	   6.11	  %	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	   	   17	   19	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
XA	  
6.92	  %	   6.97	  %	   0.29	  %	  
	   	   	  
	  	   	  	   18	   21	   0	  
	   	   	  	  	  	  	  
ANEL	  
7.51	  %	   10.60	  %	   	  	   	   	   	  
	   	   20	   33	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  
LAOS	  
	  	   	  	   5.63	  %	   3.8	  %	   2.19	  %	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	   15	   10	   0	   	  	  
	  	   Others	   5.34	  %	   18.90	  %	   4.54	  %	   2.56	  %	   2.74	  %	   4.80	  %	  
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs, ekloges.ypes.gr. 
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‘Has Greece’s economy finally turned a corner?’212 
The new government under the leadership of Samaras met one of its largest challenges 
in November when the Greek parliament approved the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy 
(MTFS) for 2013–2016, by a three-vote majority.213 The New York Times had noted as 
early as April 2010 that the financial crisis had ‘highlighted the constraints of euro 
membership’.214 Because of a common fiscal policy for the whole euro area, single 
countries are unable to devaluate in times of need to help regain competitiveness in 
the international market. The agreement between the euro area and the EU also 
dictated the requirement to meet certain budget targets, the result of which was hard 
austerity measures at a time when the economy would rather have benefitted from 
additional spending. The MTFS was a part of a larger National Restructuring Plan to 
reduce deficits and regain the credibility of the Greek economy.215 The strategy also 
included another austerity package of 13.5 billion euros. DIMAR abstained from the 
vote and members of parliament from both New Democracy and PASOK rejected the 
strategy. Later the same month, the Eurogroup decided to resume the disbursements to 
Greece, and the Greek programme was extended for another two years.216 On the 21st 
of January 2013, the Eurogroup ‘note[d] with satisfaction’ that Greece fulfilled its 
commitments.217 Greece returned to the financial market in early April 2014, for a 
first sale of government bonds since the crisis started.218 
 
The anti-racist bill and the shut down of the Public Broadcasting Service 
Between the 21st of May and the 6th of June 2013, Greece experienced an intra-
governmental crisis because of a disagreement amongst the parties of the governing 
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coalition on the content of an anti-racist bill. The increase in racist violence had led 
the more centre-left parties in government, DIMAR and PASOK, to wish for such a 
bill to supplement the existing legislative framework. The aim of the bill would be to 
impose tougher penalties for racist attacks, and could be seen as one of the first 
serious attempts by the government to counter the growing influence of Golden Dawn. 
This was later confirmed by PASOK leader Venizelos, who said, ‘Greece has a 
political grouping that is unashamedly Nazi and organizes acts violating the rule of 
law.’219 
 
Yet another crisis in the Greek government followed the government’s closing of the 
Public Broadcasting Company. The decision led to strong reactions both from the 
opposition and the trade unions. The crisis led to the withdrawal of DIMAR from 
government, upon which a new two-party government with New Democracy and 
PASOK was announced on the 24th of June.220 
 
The murder of Pavlos Fyssas and the arrest of Michaloliakos 
In September 2013, newspapers all over the world reported the murder of the anti-
fascist rapper Pavlos ‘Killah P’ Fyssas by Giorgos Roupakias, a member of XA. 
Reactions took place throughout Europe, with anti-fascist demonstrations in cities like 
Barcelona, Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam and London.221 Prime Minister Samaras was 
quick to condemn the killing and said that he would not let Golden Dawn ‘undermine’ 
democracy: ‘This government is determined not to let the descendants of the Nazis 
poison out social life or commit crimes’, Samaras reportedly said in a national TV 
address.222 Though the leadership of XA denied any connection with Roupakias or the 
murder of Fyssas, speculations on the involvement of the party began and were soon 
                                            
219 Niki Kitsantonis, ‘Push for Antiracism Bill Leads to Rift in Greek Coalition’, The New York 
Times, 28.05.2013. 
220 E Kathimerini, ‘Greece coalition partner pulls out ministers in wake of ERT debacle’, E 
Kathimerini, 21.06.2013. 
221 Margarita Papantoniou, ‘Anti-fascist Demonstrations Around Europe for Fyssas’, Greek 
Reporter, 19.09.2013; BBC, ‘”Neo-Nazi” held over Greek musician Pavlos Fyssas death’, BBC, 
18.09.2013. 
222 BBC, ‘Greece PM Antonis Samaras condemns “neo-Nazi” killing’, BBC, 19.09.2013. 
81 
  
followed by the arrest of prominent Golden Dawn members. XA’s leader, 
Michaloliakos, was also arrested and formally charged for leading a criminal 
organisation.223 The anti-terrorism unit arrested a total of 20 people, including four of 
XA’s members of parliament. 
 
As of April 2014, Michaloliakos is still in prison, awaiting trial. Golden Dawn are also 
facing a new crisis as one of the members of parliament, Chrysovalantis Alexopoulos, 
chose to leave the party and instead decided to sit in parliament as an independent. 
This was directly before the parliament was to vote on the possibility of pressing 
criminal charges against XA’s 18 members of parliament, charged for using their 
position to organise a criminal organisation. Alexopoulos himself claimed that he had 
no prior knowledge of the criminal activities of the party, and that he now withdrew 
because he no longer wished to be associated with XA’s actions and practices.224 
Alexopoulos’ actions will likely affect the trial against the members of Golden Dawn, 
including Michaloliakos, as it can be seen as an implicit admission that the acts of XA 
should indeed be seen as criminal. Alexopoulos’ proclaimed innocence could also be 
questioned if one takes into account the recruitment process of XA. Membership in 
XA can be characterised as semi-exclusive. According to XA’s statutes, ‘[a]ny Greek 
citizen or Greek in Genus’ can become a party member after a recommendation by 
two existing members of the party.225 The relevant committee must then approve the 
potential member. All new members who gain prominent positions in XA must also 
go through a trial period of one year of active involvement prior to getting the right to 
vote or stand for intraparty elections. 226 It therefore seems rather unlikely that 
Alexopoulos was unaware of XA’s policies and actions. 
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6 People’s Association – Golden Dawn 
 
Golden Dawn began as a national socialist magazine in 1980. Many of those who took 
part in the establishment of the magazine were previous members of the 4th of August 
Party that had been disbanded in 1977, including the founder of XA, Nikos 
Michaloliakos, who had joined the party at 16. The magazine was soon to be 
described as neo-Nazi and often featured articles hailing Adolf Hitler. In the late 
1970s, Michaloliakos spent time in prison. There he befriended the former Junta 
dictator Georgios Papadopoulos and was asked to lead the youth organisation of the 
far right party EPEN. He left the organisation a few years later in order to establish 
Golden Dawn as a political party. However, Golden Dawn did not participate in 
national elections until 1996, in which they won 4,487 votes or 0.07 per cent of the 
total votes.227 After their defeat, XA temporarily retreated from politics until their 
comeback in the local elections in Athens in 2010. Here they won 5.29 per cent of the 
vote and Michaloliakos gained a seat in the city council.228  
 
To understand the ideology of Golden Dawn one needs to take into account not only 
official party documents, but also the writings and activities of the party leaders. To 
try to define what the party is working towards may be just as interesting as finding 
out what they are against. The analysis is therefore structured into three parts. The 
first part will answer the following question: What do they want? This may sound 
simple enough. XA wishes to create a popular state229, but what exactly does this 
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entail? Who constitutes the people that will be allowed to reside within this state and 
who will be excluded? The second part will look at the organisation, including the 
structure of the movement and use of symbols. The third part will look at the electoral 
base of XA and also discuss what motives may have governed people’s decision to 
vote for the party.  
 
Ideology 
The ideology of Golden Dawn is mainly presented in The Program of the Golden 
Dawn and Our Identity, The Manifesto of Golden Dawn. 230 From now on, these two 
documents are only referred to as the Programme and the Manifesto. 
 
The third great ideology and the popular state 
In Chapter 2 I mentioned that typical forms of nationalism seek to preserve and 
highlight common features within a populace, aiming to create some form of unity. 
According to the Manifesto, ‘nationalism is the only absolute and true revolution 
because it seeks the birth of new moral, spiritual and mental values.’ Nationalism is 
also frequently referred to as the ‘Third Great Ideology’. This ideology does not want 
‘to salvage anything from the current economic and social interests that lead nations, 
peoples and cultures in decline.’ Golden Dawn is also open about its critique of the 
existing political system, and especially the left and right spectrum of party politics. 
These two opposing poles are an illusion created to uphold the dominance of 
‘cosmopolitan internationalists, anti-national and anti-social forces.’ The only solution 
to this is to abandon the system altogether, and instead create a popular state ‘where 
political power comes from the people, without party promoters.’231 The Metapolitefsi 
era, i.e., the time after the fall of the Junta is seen as a ‘national tragedy’. It is the ‘the 
final act of a drama that led our Nation to financial destruction, dissolved the social 
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and national fabric of our country, crushed the Hellenic ethos and every traditional 
value.’232 
 
Though the Manifesto is against party promoters, the Programme leaves no doubt 
about the fact that there is still one party that should be allowed. However, the XA 
shall, once having gained power through democratic means, rely heavily on 
referendums. In fact, the people should be truly sovereign and referendums should 
therefore be held ‘for every important national issue’.233 According to XA, the people 
have never before been able to express its opinion in major political decisions. 
Ministers should be appointed on the grounds of knowledge and experience, and will 
not receive any special treatment. Their privileges will be abolished, and their 
payment reduced. It may seem ironic that in the Programme, XA also want to abolish 
the immunity of ministers, the very immunity that the sitting parliament at this very 
moment is trying to remove in order to formally charge XA’s members of parliament 
for participating in illegal activities. 
 
The goal is ‘to revive Hellenism and help Hellas become a central power of the 
geopolitically sensitive area of the Eastern Mediterranean.’234 To achieve this goal one 
must first reach national independence. The Programme emphasises the strategic, 
geopolitical value of Greece, including Cyprus, and maintains that it is possible to 
solve the modern financial problems and give Greece a prominent position on the 
international market if her resources are properly exploited. For energy and resources, 
Greece should turn away from the West and instead concentrate on Russia and the 
Middle East. The Greek debt should be deleted, and all connections to the EMU and 
the EU should be broken. For XA, the power lies in the hands of the ‘Hellenes’ and 
the popularly termed Grexit is seen as a huge weapon as ‘[t]he cost of Greece’s exit 
from the EU will be disastrous for the world economy.’235 A Grexit would create a 
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domino effect, ‘Portugal, Spain and Italy would be next […] and the whole planet will 
be facing an economic depression.’236 
 
In 2012, Eurostat could report that 31 per cent of the population, 3.5 million people, 
were living near or below the poverty line.237 As for unemployment, levels reached an 
all time high in November 2013 with 28 per cent of the total population, an increase 
from 7.7 per cent in 2008. The unemployment rate for young people between the ages 
of 15 and 24 went up from 28.9 per cent to 63.2 per cent for females and from 17 per 
cent to 48.4 per cent for men between 2008 and 2012.238 The suicide rates also went 
up. A newly released study shows that austerity was the cause of over 500 cases of 
suicide in men between 2009 and 2010.239 
 
In the words of XA, ‘[e]very foreign worker equals a Greek unemployed.’240 The 
party therefore wishes to fight unemployment by deporting all illegal immigrants. 
They also wish to strengthen the national economy through an increase in primary 
production. Work will be hard, and they do not promise richness and glory, only the 
sufficient means to get by. XA therefore wants to recoup the loan the Bank of Greece 
gave to the German Army during the occupation in the Second World War.241 
 
A Golden Dawner  
Twelve points that characterise what it means to be a Golden Dawner build up The 
Manifesto of Golden Dawn and each point is written as a personal testimony.  
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[As a Golden Dawner] I embrace the need for a […] state that constantly serves the eternal 
revolutionary principles of the Nationalist Worldview, with the ultimate goal of forming a 
new society and a new type of man.242 
 
This is the second point of the Manifesto. It not only speaks of a revolution to replace 
the existing society, but for a revolution that goes even deeper, where the ultimate 
goal is to create ενός νέου τύπου ανθρώπου, a new type of man, or a new race 
altogether. This society should be governed by the popular state and the power should 
reside with the people. This point is similar to Griffin’s palingenetic ultra-nationalism 
that speaks of a revolution in which a new man will be created. This new type of man 
is born out of the decadence and experience that have led to the decay of modern 
society. A Golden Dawner is an enemy of the existing system, or in their own words, 
of ‘every power that spreads this disease that finds foothold in the Plutocracy’.243 For 
XA these powers represent the reason for Greece’s decay, not only in recent years, but 
all the way back to the Second World War.  
 
The revolution is sometimes referred to as the end of the Metapolitefsi. This could be 
interpreted as a critique solely of the developments after, and not of the developments 
prior to, the regime of the Junta. That XA Ameriki and other Golden Dawn members 
frequently refer to the 4th of August regime of Metaxas, and have also gone so far as 
to compare XA leader Michaloliakos to the military dictator, supports this 
interpretation.244 So too does the party’s use of the Celtic cross as one of their 
symbols, as Metaxas also did (see figure 3 below). It may then seem ironic that the 
third point in the Manifesto states that they do not support previous right-wing 
regimes, they mention, for instance, that they neither support a military-financial 
dictatorship, nor a parliamentary dictatorship, i.e., the Junta and the two-party system 
of ND and PASOK, as ‘those are two sides of the same coin, and their purpose is to 
                                            
242 XA Ameriki, ‘The Manifesto of Golden Dawn’. 
243 ibid.   
244 See XA Ameriki, ‘Frequently asked questions’, xaameriki.wordpress.com/faq/ [22.03.2014]. 
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tear down national identity.’ Put another way, XA wants a revolution, even though 
they advocate a type of nationalism that also glorifies the past.  
 
International aspirations 
Golden Dawn not only works for the ‘indigenous Greeks’ within the Greek borders, 
but has also long sought cooperation with similar organisations abroad, and exhibited 
a will to expand beyond its own borders. According to XA’s view that all who are 
born Greek are Greek nationals, the party also wishes to include Greeks living abroad. 
In an article about XA’s wish to expand ‘wherever there are Greeks’, Dimitris Psarras 
says that Golden Dawn ‘not only wants to become the central pole of a pan-European 
alliance of neo-Nazis,’ but that ‘[i]t wants to spread its influence worldwide.’245 Local 
branches of Golden Dawn have been established in other parts of the world as well, 
with XA Ameriki being the most prominent one. 
 
Michaloliakos has also been open about his support for a revival of the Megali Idea 
and has expressed wishes to take back Turkey and Izmir as well as the Black Sea.246 
 
Xenophobia and anti-immigration 
‘The nation is one race. That’s how God fixed [the] Earth’, Golden Dawn Member of 
Parliament Ilias Panagiotaros said in an interview done by the Australian news 
channel 60 Minutes.247 For him, the number of illegal immigrants in the past years is 
seen as an invasion. It is an undeclared war that someone needs to fight. Being the 
gateway to Europe from both the Asian and the African continent, Greece has 
experienced an increase in immigration over the past years.248 The numbers increased 
                                            
245 Dimitris Psarras, quoted in Helena Smith, ‘Greece’s neo-Nazi Golden Dawn goes global with 
political ambitions’, The Guardian, 01.04.2013. 
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even further due to EU regulations that allow member states to send immigrants back 
to the European country in which they first set foot, which is often Greece. Members 
of XA are often accused of violent acts towards immigrants and ethnic minorities. In 
March 2013, the British TV broadcaster Channel 4 published a video made by the 
student Konstantinos Georgousis, who had spent a month filming members of Golden 
Dawn on the streets of Athens. The video shows how members of XA operate on the 
streets of the Greek capital, campaigning for their party and proudly expressing their 
extreme ideas and proclaiming their hatred for immigrants.249 This is also stated in 
The Manifesto of Golden Dawn. The second paragraph is worth quoting in its entirety: 
 
The social [popular] nationalist movement of GOLDEN DAWN [sic] finds itself at the 
frontline of the struggle against nation-killing memorandum and the sinful regime of the 
parties that consists the political establishment. We fight against altering our racial 
demographics by the millions of illegal immigrants, and the dissolution of the Greek society 
promoted by both the coalition parties and the so-called left. We propose a national strategy 
so that we can overcome the crisis imposed on our country. We are struggling for a Greece 
that belongs to the Greeks.250 
 
The last sentence warrants particular attention. It suggests that the Greek identity is 
exclusive rather than inclusive. The question, then, is to whom does the title of 
‘Greek’ apply? As the previous chapters on Greek history have shown, the Greek 
identity was not originally based on ethnic criteria, but was instead determined by 
linguistic as well as territorial grounds. Today Greek nationality can be acquired either 
through descent, following the principle of jus sanguinis, or through naturalisation. 
Obtaining nationality through naturalisation is possible for aliens over the age of 18 if 
one follows the following three prerequisites: 
 
a) One makes a declaration before the mayor or chairman of the village where one resides; 
b) One has lived within Greece the last ten out of twelve years or if one intend to reside in 
Greece five years after the declaration concerning naturalisation; 
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c) One has submitted an application for naturalisation to the Ministry of the Interior251 
 
It is then up to the minister of the interior to decide whether or not the alien should be 
naturalised after an investigation of the character and personality of the alien. 
However, when asked to define whom XA considers as Greek, XA Ameriki states that 
the party line of XA is that you are born Greek, you do not become Greek. In other 
words, XA emphasises the use of nationality defined through blood rather than by 
naturalisation. The question of immigration, and especially of illegal immigration, is 
referred to as the ‘Elephant in the Room’.252 According to XA Ameriki, about 1/3 of 
the Greek population live ‘condensed’ in the metropolitan areas of Athens, and the 
areas are getting increasingly more crowded because ‘roughly around 4/5ths of 
Greece’s 3 million illegal immigrants have also settled there’ in the past 15 years.253 
XA opposes the increase of immigrants in the past two decades and claims that 
Greece had little experience with violence and rape, before the large inflow of 
immigrants.  
 
When the indigenous Greek population cried for help, the state ignored them, as most wealthy 
state officials lived in areas where all illegal immigrants did was take care of their large 
gardens and houses as servants.254  
 
The sentence is highlighted in bold and the ‘Elephant in the Room’ is illustrated by a 
video of Shi’ite Muslims in Greece celebrating the religious festival of Ashura with 
prayer, song and self-flagellation.255 
 
Some have claimed that the success of Golden Dawn in the 2012 elections was also 
due to their pledge ‘to “scour the country” clean of illegal immigrants.’ 256 
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Nevertheless, it should be said that it is not only the parties on the far right that have 
expressed discontentment with immigration. In front of the second election of 2012, 
ND’s Samaras reportedly called for a crackdown on immigrants, promising that the 
‘mass invasion of immigrants’ would stop and the ‘mass return to their homelands’ 
would begin.257 In that sense, the leader of ND only affirms what seems to have 
become a strong tendency towards xenophobia, especially on the streets of Athens. 
The violence against immigrants predates the crisis, but it was not highlighted until 
two Afghans killed a Greek man on his way to fetch the car to take his pregnant wife 
to the hospital. For Golden Dawn, this was probably an opportunity they could not 
ignore, and they arranged for a pogrom that lasted for two weeks, in which fascist 
gangs frequently attacked non-whites in broad daylight. They also destroyed 
immigrant shops.258 XA has also proposed placing landmines on the borders of Greece 
to permanently prevent a continued inflow of illegal immigrants.259 
 
A study done by the Racist Violence Recording Network reported 87 attacks in 
Greece between January and September 2012. 83 of these attacks took place in public 
spaces for all to see.260 The report also emphasised incidents in which there was a 
connection between the police and racist violence. As an example, it is interesting to 
note that Greek mainstream media stopped reporting ‘Neo-Nazi attacks on migrant 
communities’ at the end of 2012.261 Approximately half a year later, in June 2013, 
Human Rights Watch launched the report Unwelcome Guests, detailing the actions of 
the Greek police towards what they assumed to be illegal immigrants. The police 
operation started in August 2012 and was named ‘Operation Xenios Zeus’, named 
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after the Greek god of hospitality.262 The HRW report had gone through official 
statistics and found that between the 4th of August 2012 and the 22nd of February 
2013, almost 85,000 people of foreign origin had been stopped on the streets of 
Athens and led to the police station for further examination of identification papers 
and legal status. Out of these 85,000 people, only 6 per cent proved to be residing 
unlawfully in Greece. The reports document that xenophobic violence and anti-
immigration have proved not to be a phenomenon isolated to far right groupings such 
as Golden Dawn.  
 
Organisation 
 
Structure 
Little has previously been officially known about the structure of Golden Dawn. 
Recently, E Kathimerini wrote that documents unveiling more information about the 
organisational structure of XA had been found at the apartments of many of the 
arrested members of parliament. After the arrest of yet another of Golden Dawn’s 
members of parliament, Christos Pappas, in April 2014, new discoveries showed 
documents describing the structure of XA being similar to a medieval German 
military order with a rigid hierarchy. 263  Amongst the documents was also an 
organisational chart in the form of a pyramid of power with the leader at the top.264 
 
The organisation is more similar to a paramilitary movement than a political party, 
and it includes a youth organisation and stormtroopers dressed in black, usually with 
‘Chrysi Avgi’ in capital white letters on the back. Both a youth organisation and 
stormtroopers were also a visible part of the German Nazis, and a youth organisation 
was also part of the 4th of August regime of Metaxas. 
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Symbols and symbolism 
The name of the party should also be discussed. The name Golden Dawn creates an 
image of the rising sun, both a symbol of new beginnings – Golden Dawn refers to 
itself as a new (and better) alternative to the existing system – and of eternity – the sun 
will always rise. Also, if something is golden it is considered pure, and so the party 
name can be interpreted as a symbol of a pure new start, free from the decadence of 
the previous society. Once again we are reminded of the palingenetic aspect of fascist 
ideology (see Chapter 2). I will get back to this in Chapter 7. 
 
XA not only glorifies the past in words, but also by tactical use of symbols. The 
emblem of Golden Dawn is often referred to as a symbol that is either similar to or a 
modified version of the swastika.265 In reality, the symbol is called the meandros and 
it is also known as the Greek key in archaeological circles. A meander means a turn or 
wind in a stream, and the name originates from the river Maiandros in Asia Minor. It 
can also refer to a labyrinth, a common symbol in Minoan culture. The meandros is 
used in the official party flag, often depicted in black on a bright red background (see 
Figure 1). The use of symbols can be a powerful way of spreading one’s message to 
an external audience. The symbols in use should be rather simple, but yet again 
unique, so that people easily recognise them on the street. An example is the sticker 
found on a bus shed near Mytilini in the Greek island of Lesvos (Figure 1). The 
message is easy enough – the name of the party in capital letters above the meander, 
and below it announces that this is a local branch of the organisation, located on the 
island. All is written in red on a black background, making it easy to spot at a long 
distance. 
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Figure 1: A sticker from a bus stop in Lesvos showing the symbol of Golden Dawn. Photo: Author. 
The meandros serves both as a symbol and a reminder of the ancient roots of the 
Greeks, as well as being a reminder of the Nazis. It should be mentioned that the 
swastika is not an unfamiliar symbol for XA; pictures from a conference in 1990 show 
the congress hall decorated with swastika flags.266 
 
Like the party name, the meandros – and also the swastika – can be interpreted as 
symbols of eternity, similar to the circle and the sun. The use of the old sun cross, or 
the Celtic cross (Figure 2), further strengthens the metaphor of eternity. This type of 
crosses has been used in old fascist movements, like the Nazi party of Norway before 
and during the Second World War, and was also used in the symbol for Metaxas’ 4th 
of August Regime (Figure 3).  
 
In 2012, Michaloliakos was filmed using the Nazi salute in the Athens city council.267 
In his defence he reportedly said that the salute was not the one usually connected 
with Adolf Hitler, but rather a version of the old Graeco-Roman Salute. Once again 
we are reminded of Metaxas, as the salute was also used by his youth organisation in 
the late 1930s. Michaloliakos did, however, later confirm that it was indeed a 
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reference to the Nazis, and the media have later gotten hold of footage picturing 
prominent members of XA doing the same Nazi salute.268 
 
 
Figure 2: A typical sun cross/Celtic cross. 
 
Figure 3: The cross as it was used by Metaxa's 4th of August regime. 
 
 
Figure 4: Black cross on red background. Used by Golden Dawn.269 
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Solidarity programmes: Helping only Greeks 
The Social Solidarity Program of the Golden Dawn includes food and clothing drives, 
legal aid, medical exams, a blood bank and lastly a hospitality programme providing 
financial aid for those who wish to support and travel to relatives in need of intensive 
medical care. Information about the programmes is available in the Golden Dawn 
International Newsroom, ‘Your only source for news regarding the Social Nationalist 
Movement of the Golden Dawn, in English, free of Western Marxist propaganda.’270 
 
During one of their help programmes, the old Horst-Wessel lied frequently used by 
the Nazis was played over the loudspeakers, with new lyrics in Greek.271 The song, 
which is also known as ‘keep the banner flying’, was played while members of XA 
handed out food and clothing to those in need. However, all who wished to receive 
help were thoroughly checked by party members to make sure that non-Greeks were 
excluded from any benefits. The whole event was filmed and later published both on 
the party’s website and the party’s channel on YouTube. The day the party had picked 
for their charity event was the 39th anniversary of the fall of the Junta, a day celebrated 
as the restoration of democracy. Michaloliakos purportedly commented that they did 
not chose this day by coincidence, but rather wished to emphasise that though ‘[the 
government] say they are celebrating the return of democracy … they are really 
celebrating state thievery, scandals, and treason.’272 Similar events were also reported 
in back in 2012.273 
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Electoral support 
Some have said that they vote for XA to ‘punish’ the politicians they believe have led 
Greece into the crisis.274 The party is seen as trustworthy, in contrast to leading 
politicians. A woman interviewed by Daniel Trilling for an article published in New 
Statesman in December 2012 explains:  
 
They say to you, ‘I am the devil’, and they are the devils. I prefer someone that says the truth 
and says to me, ‘You know what, I am the bad guy,’ rather than another one that says to me, 
‘I am the good guy and I will save you.’275 
 
Her view is not unique. A survey done by Metron Analysis shows that the desire to 
punish mainstream parties was the motive for up to 40 per cent of Golden Dawn 
voters, whilst being the motive for only 14 per cent of the entire electorate.276 Forms 
of political protest have previously taken the shape of support for the extreme sides to 
both the right and the left in Greek politics. It is worth noting that the increase in 
support for SYRIZA after the financial crisis may also have contributed to a rise in 
support for the right, as the Greek people seem just as scared of the left as they are of 
the right. People are scared when something exceeds what is considered ‘normal’, and 
so in the end, as I mentioned in Chapter 2, when something has become extreme, it 
does not matter on which side it originates. 
 
The question that still remains to be answered is how XA manages to have a stable 
percentage of support, according to the opinion polls, despite the party’s extreme 
ideology? It may seem that the Greek people in desperation choose to ignore the 
extreme positions, and instead focused on the party’s will to change the society. The 
saying ‘extreme times calls for extreme measures’ comes to mind. XA is not only seen 
as trustworthy, but also as the only party that is able to do what others, like the 
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governing politicians, dare not.277 The sudden increase in support for Golden Dawn 
suggests that the Greek people were looking for change. The parliamentary elections 
of 2012 may support such a claim. Increased unemployment, especially amongst the 
younger population, had contributed to an increase of the tension between the 
populace and the government.  
 
The earthquake election of May 2012 could at the time be interpreted as a onetime 
phenomenon, but the fact that XA maintained a stable percentage in the June elections 
just a few weeks later refutes any such claims. The previously mentioned survey by 
Metron Analysis also shows the earlier political preferences for voters of XA.278 In 
May, 33.9 per cent had previously voted for ND, 23.3 per cent for PASOK and 12.3 
per cent for LAOS. There was also a significant percentage, 20.9 per cent, of the vote 
that came from new voters. In June, 64 per cent of those who voted had also voted for 
XA in May. This suggests that a significant amount of the votes actually came from 
people who had not voted for the party in May, but changed their minds during the six 
intervening weeks. It is also interesting to note that the electoral basis drew on a 
variety of other political parties, not only on the right, but also on the left of the 
political spectrum.   
 
As for the demographics of the voters, a total of 76 per cent of those who voted for 
XA were men, whereas only 24 per cent were women. This is in sharp contrast to the 
fact that of the entire sample, only 58 per cent were men and 42 per cent women. They 
drew an almost even amount of votes in all age groups from 18 to 54, but less in the 
older age groups from 55 to 65 and older. When it comes to levels of education, 58 
per cent of those who voted for XA had an intermediate education, meaning that they 
had completed high school or technical training. As for the occupation of the workers, 
the highest percentage of those who voted for XA were white-collar workers, 
employers and independent contractors, unemployed, or public servants. 
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Younger support 
XA has a special appeal in the younger population and was one of the parties that 
received the highest share of the young vote in the 2012 elections. In 2012, 
MYPLACE279 reported that the violence and the military structure of XA seemed to 
impress the young:  
 
[T]here are now school students that salute their friends and even their teachers using the 
characteristic Nazi salutation, paint swastikas on the school walls and recruit their friends and 
fellow students.280  
 
The party was becoming fashionable.281 As part of their solidarity programmes, XA 
members have also been known to be active in neighbourhood initiatives, especially in 
areas with an increased report of migrant violence. They are there to protect, and there 
have been reports of members handing out phone numbers to children, claiming to be 
only a phone call away if they need protection on their way home from school.282 The 
recruitment of young students is usually done through sports clubs or the Internet. 
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7 The appeal of the extreme right 
 
In Chapter 1 I presented the following research question: 
 
In light of the recent financial crisis, how do modern Greek history and political 
tradition, party ideology, and European integration through membership in the 
European Union affect the rise of the extreme right party Golden Dawn? 
 
The previous chapters have considered Greek history from 1821 and up until today, 
emphasising the developments since the financial crisis of 2008. I have also looked at 
the ideology and electoral support of Golden Dawn as well as the organisation in 
itself. In this chapter I will discuss some of the factors that have been presented as 
possible contributing causes for the increase in support for Golden Dawn. The first 
question I wish to answer is whether this increase in support was to be expected 
considering the political situation in Greece and the political cleavages that go back to 
the 1820s, or if the financial crisis might have been the precipitating cause? The 
second is whether the case of Greece can be seen as unique? 
 
History, nationalism and political tradition 
It is not only in the categorisation of Golden Dawn as either ‘right-wing’, ‘populist’, 
‘fascist’, ‘neo-Nazi’ or all of them combined that the party shares a resemblance with 
other right-wing and populist movements in general – and German Nazism in 
particular. My review of the modern history of Greece has shown the influence 
enjoyed by far right parties, especially in the military. Unstable democracies were 
frequently replaced by temporary military dictatorships, the regimes of General 
Metaxas and the military Junta being the most prominent ones. The pursuit of a 
national identity has also been a dominating force, and Greece has been struggling to 
find her place at the corner of Europe, bordering two other great continents.  
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Yannis Andricopoulos argues that the ‘power base of authoritarianism in Greece has 
consistently been the military, acting as an agent for the monarchy and/or the 
bourgeoisie, or in its own interests as a power élite.’283 Internal as well as external 
forces have taken part in shaping Greek politics throughout the years, and personal 
interests have no doubt played a significant role. This can be seen not only in the 
frequent occurrence of corruption and clientelism, but also in the almost dynastic 
aspects of Greek politics, in which family name is everything and positions at times 
seem to be inherited from father to son. 
 
It is this idea of a corrupt political system that Golden Dawn wishes to change. Even 
though XA was not established until 1980, I argue that the ideology of the movement 
can be traced back to the struggle to create a unified Greek nation from Greece’s 
independence in 1821. Greece is a young nation built on the foreign premises of 
western powers. Nationalist sentiment is stronger in younger than in older nations, and 
foreign involvement only intensifies the wish for complete self-rule. As we have seen, 
the history since 1821 is full of examples of foreign interference, first by the choosing 
of the first king of Greece, later by the British support of the right’s fight against the 
communists during the civil war, and even later by the United States’ support for the 
colonels’ regime, a ‘natural’ reaction considering the tensions of the cold war. The 
bailout, under the supervision of the Troika, the IMF and the EU, can be – and has 
been – interpreted as yet another incident in which foreign powers meddle in official 
state affairs. The result has been a people that seem to feel trapped within a society 
governed by non-democratic external policies and with little individual opportunity to 
actively participate in government policy-making. The fact that many of those who 
voted for XA in the last elections said they did so to punish the sitting government 
might support this view, especially if one takes into account that XA was seen by 
many as the only party willing to do something for the Greek people. XA has thereby 
managed to use Greek history to create their own power base, using populist rhetoric 
to play on the already strong nationalist sentiments in the population.  
                                            
283 Androcopoulos 1980:568. 
101 
  
 
Xenophobia and anti-Immigration:  
The hesitant police response 
‘The murder that awakened Greece’ was the headline in an article published by Ola 
Storeng in the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten on the 1st of October 2013.284 The 
murder of Pavlos Fyssas had led to a sudden, but massive reaction from the police. 
The media saw it as a long-awaited response that strengthened the sitting government. 
The question that still remained to be answered at the time was: Why had the 
government waited so long to take action? According to Storeng there were 
indications that as many as half the police force in Greece had voted for XA in the 
previous year’s elections. A poll conducted by Public Issue in September 2013 
showed that the support for XA at the time had reached 13 per cent, though it should 
be taken into account that the poll was conducted before the murder of Pavlos Fyssas 
later that month. 285 Nevertheless, a new survey, this time asking questions related to 
the recent arrest of Michaloliakos in October, showed that 14 per cent of the 
population disagreed with his pre-trial detention. When asked about the arrest of three 
other prominent members of XA, 27 per cent agreed with their release on bail.286 The 
results do not give us an accurate percentage of the support of Golden Dawn in the 
general population after the arrests in late September 2013; however, they do provide 
us with a rough estimate, and it is not unthinkable that people might have responded 
negatively because it was a sudden mass arrest of democratically elected members of 
parliament. In that way it might support the view of the Huffington Post stated above, 
and it might also explain why the police had seemed so hesitant to react when Golden 
Dawn members patrolled the streets, dressed in black and beating up what they 
presumed to be illegal immigrants. 
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There is another explanation. Just before the murder of Fyssas, the sitting minister of 
public security, Nikos Dendias, had assembled information regarding 32 incidents in 
which the police had refused to respond to violent acts, most of them related to XA 
member activities.287 Prime Minister Samaras gave Dendias permission to fire police 
chiefs, and an internal investigation began to look at these 32 violent incidents.  The 
violence within the police is confirmed in a report launched by Amnesty International 
in March 2014. When asked about the report, Jezercan Tigani in Amnesty 
International says: ‘Our research has shown that the rise of Golden Dawn is only the 
tip of the iceberg.’288 The report uncovered a variety of incidents of severe racism and 
excessive use of force within the police force. Another surprising turn of events was 
made public in early April 2014 when The Guardian could report that Prime Minister 
Samaras was facing possible resignation after his chief of staff had been caught on 
tape saying that Samaras had instigated the prosecution of XA for political gain.289 
Again we are reminded of the tendency towards a corrupt political elite becoming a 
premise in Greek politics, as was also mentioned in the previous section. 
 
The ideology and symbolism of Golden Dawn 
The Guardian frequently uses the terms far right as well as neo-Nazi when referring to 
the XA. Others state that they are fascist. The Manifesto emphasise nationalism and 
the ‘Nationalist Worldview’, but what exactly does this imply? It should be 
unnecessary to say that Nazism and nationalism is not the same thing. Yet for Golden 
Dawn this is of some importance, as they are frequently referred to as both. Similarly,  
fascism is not the same as Nazism, though it can be the other way around. Members of 
XA deny any accusations of Nazism and the Programme states that: 
 
                                            
287 Storeng, ‘Drapet som vekket Hellas’. 
288 Jezercan Tigani in Amnesty International, quoted in Karoline Kvellestad Isaksen, ‘Rapport: 
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A law unto themselves: A culture of abuse and impunity in the Greek police, Amnesty International, 
EUR 25/005/2014, 03.04.2014. 
289 Helena Smith, ‘Greek prime minister facing resignations calls after aide’s gaffe’, The 
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The Golden Dawn is a purely Greek political phenomenon. Nothing to do with other countries 
and historical periods [sic]. It is the People's Nationalist Movement, the success of which will 
make a difference for our survival as a Nation-State.290 
 
Despite denials, known members of XA have stated being supporters of both Adolf 
Hitler and the ideas of Nazism. The same pertains to the symbolism of the party’s 
exterior, as has been discussed above. Whether one interprets the symbols and 
ideology of Golden Dawn as fascist statements and reminders of Nazism or as strictly 
nationalist sentiments and reminders of the old Hellenes is up to each individual. In 
that way the symbolism of XA is more implicit rather than explicit, and those who 
vote for them may see what they wish to see and ignore the rest. Thus it is mainly 
those who are aware of traditional fascist symbols that will recognise the use of the 
Horst-Wessel lied or the idea of a party symbol referring to eternity. Nevertheless, in 
an article published by The Independent in February 2013, professor at Panteion 
University, Vassiliki Georgiadou, who has studied Golden Dawn for years, comments: 
‘[…] They use ancient Greek history as a camouflage to hide their true identity: that 
they’re fans of Hitler, anti-Semitism.’291 This was again confirmed in 60 minutes’ 
interview with XA Member of Parliament Ilias Panagiotaros, which was referred to in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Despite being inspired by earlier fascist and authoritarian movements, both in Greece 
and in Europe, XA wishes to represent something new. Vangelis Lagos in MYPLACE 
has been part of a team of researchers doing extensive analyses of all available 
documents by Golden Dawn, including those of associated organisations. He claims 
that XA is a revolutionary, totalitarian ultra-nationalist organisation with the goal of 
salvaging the nation. XA see a nation in peril that can only be salvaged by destroying 
the whole previous political and social history of the nation. Lagos adds that XA 
rejects and denounces any notion of human or individual rights as well as all forms of 
democracy. Everything must be destroyed in order for a new nation to be born out of 
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the ashes. Again we are reminded of the palingenetic aspect of fascism, as I will get 
back to shortly. 
 
The financial crisis and the bailout 
It is striking that Golden Dawn as a movement, as well as the surrounding events upon 
which it has built its popularity, share similarities with earlier as well as contemporary 
movements. Nevertheless, Greece was not the only country struck by the crisis. In fact 
the crisis was probably just as deep in other similar South European countries such as 
Spain, Portugal and Italy, with unemployment levels skyrocketing as the crisis 
deepened. Despite this, these countries have not seen an increase in right-wing 
extremism. Instead they have seen other forms of political protest, such as separatism 
and far left mobilisation in Spain, and general populism with Beppe Grillo’s 
Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy. Even so, the rise in support for right-wing movements is 
not a phenomenon that can be isolated to Greece; there has in fact been a right-wing 
upsurge in many European countries in recent years. Other studies have shown that in 
June 2011, populist radical parties were represented in national parliaments in twelve 
of the then twenty-seven member states of the EU.292 This included Greece, with 
LAOS representing the radical right with an electoral result of 5.6 per cent at the time.  
 
Many thought LAOS would be the main opponent to ND, but the party moderated 
itself and became increasingly mainstream.293 As part of the tripartite government 
with ND and PASOK, LAOS also supported the bailout agreement, leaving Golden 
Dawn as the only far right party with significant electoral support to oppose the 
bailout and the Memoranda. According to Antonis A. Ellinas, this is the first out of 
three main reasons for Golden Dawn’s electoral success in 2012. The second is ‘the 
failure of the political system to provide alternative forms of political participation’, 
which led to ‘the legitimation of and support for political violence as a means to 
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express political dissatisfaction’.294 This might also in part explain why the police 
took their time to react to the street violence of XA. The third point is xenophobia.  
Eurobarometer polls show that Greeks are more apprehensive than other Europeans, 
and Greek public opinion has also viewed increased immigration with some 
scepticism.295 
 
According to journalist Jamie Bartlett, the support for the far right is a general 
tendency that can be traced back at least twenty years, and is therefore not a direct 
consequence of the financial crisis. He builds his argument on the following: First of 
all, many known far right parties in Europe saw a decrease in support directly after the 
crisis, and those who increased their support were parties in more prosperous 
countries which experienced a smaller effect of the crisis. Second, the far right parties 
in general ‘cite immigration, a lack of integration by minorities, and national identity 
being under threat as their motivating force.’296 
 
It is not economics and austerity that increase the support of the far right, neither is it 
culture. Instead, the one thing all far right parties have in common is their opposition 
to the present political system. In the case of Greece, however, I argue that it is a 
combination of all the above-mentioned factors. The scepticism towards, and collapse 
of trust in, leading politicians, political parties and the system in general, are the 
underlying causes for their increased support, but economics and the austerity 
measures, directly related to the financial crisis, are the precipitating causes. The crisis 
and the austerity measures are seen as proof of the faults of the political system and 
have further strengthened the far right’s call for change. And so the popularity of 
Golden Dawn might, in the words of the Huffington Post, have been a ‘symptom of 
the alienation and hardship that their society is experiencing.’297 
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Vangelis Lagos confirms this. In contrast to my suggestion that the results of the 
elections in 2012 was a protest vote mainly motivated by a need for change and a wish 
to punish the sitting government, Lagos believes the votes were cast out of ideological 
conviction.298 There are three things that might support his argument. First, the stable 
percentage from the May to the June elections do not bear witness to a one-time 
protest vote, but rather suggest a wish for long-term change. Second, if the votes were 
cast in an anti-austerity protest, the other anti-austerity parties should also have gained 
a higher percentage of the vote. Third, ever since the 1990s, nationalism and 
xenophobia have been prominent features not only in politics, but also in the general 
population, and a vote for Golden Dawn could therefore be perceived as an extension 
of the nationalist sentiment already present in the population. If Lagos is correct, XA 
is an example of a party that has been able to use populist rhetoric to turn a significant 
percentage of the population in their favour. What is even more significant is how the 
party has maintained a stable level of support throughout the financial crisis, despite 
the many crises within the party. 
 
Golden Dawn: A step further to the right? 
The purpose of Roger Griffin’s work towards a generic definition of fascism was to 
create a concept broad enough to include a wide range of previously categorised 
fascist movements, whilst narrow enough to exclude enough movements to keep the 
concept from becoming too general. His definition includes the words ‘populist’, 
‘nationalism’ and ‘palingenetic’. This is similar to my use of the concepts as presented 
in my theoretical framework. I proceed to go a step further in using the generic 
definition as one of the principles crucial to defining extreme right-wing movements 
like Golden Dawn.  
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How, then, does Golden Dawn fit the generic definition? Here one should be mindful 
of the difference between a movement, a party and a regime. In my opinion XA is 
both a movement and a party – or more precisely; it is first and foremost a movement, 
and second a movement that has participated in elections as a party. As for a regime, it 
is not until a party has come to power that one can witness how it will use its power to 
govern. In the case of XA, that has not yet happened, and it is therefore mainly as a 
movement that XA will be analysed. 
 
Golden Dawn is a populist movement. Chapter 2 considered two different 
interpretations of populism. The first, represented by Cas Mudde, created a social 
cleavage between the people and the elite – in the case of Greece represented at first 
by the military and later by the politicians. It is a populist belief that politics should 
then be expressed through the volonté general, not for the benefit of the elite, thereby 
reminding us of the democratic aspect of populism. This is in line with the second 
interpretation of populism represented by Margaret Canovan and Anthony Painter.  
 
Golden Dawn is based on ‘people power’, in line with Griffin’s definition of 
‘populist’. As a party, both the Manifesto and the Programme speak of the importance 
of the people and how they will be included in every important decision if XA ever 
comes to power. As a movement, XA resembles a leader cult more than a ‘people’s 
association’; with a hierarchic structure, the leader on the top is the one making the 
calls, and in theory, what the leader says is law. In practice, Golden Dawn has several 
leadership figures, and though they may have to answer to Michaloliakos, they seem 
to be allowed to speak freely. It does not seem that the fact that Michaloliakos has 
been imprisoned since September has significantly weakened the party, though it 
should be mentioned that the withdrawal of Chrysovalantis Alexopoulos as one of 
XA’s members of parliament (see Chapter 5), may have been an example of a slight 
wither. At the same time, as a response to the investigations against the party and in 
the case of a ban from national politics, Golden Dawn has announced the 
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establishment of a new party: the National Dawn.299 This does not look like a 
movement in panic or in decay, but rather a movement that intend to weather this 
crisis. 
 
Golden Dawn is nationalist. It fits Griffin’s definition of ultra-nationalism as a part of 
his generic definition understood as ‘forms of nationalism which “go beyond”, and 
hence reject, anything compatible with liberal institutions or with the tradition of 
Enlightenment humanism which underpins them.’300 As we have seen, nationalism 
has also been important in shaping the history and development of modern Greece. 
Anthony D. Smith’s idea of nationalism as attempts to unify a people and identify 
those who do not belong is also highly relevant in the case of XA – especially if one is 
to believe the polls and the media reports that suggest that XA’s promise of a vendetta 
against illegal immigrants may in part have been the reason for their electoral success 
in 2012. 
 
Golden Dawn is fascist. Not only in their resemblance to other fascist movements, 
their use of symbols and exultation of earlier dictators, such as Hitler and Metaxas 
(and Stalin!301), or in their more extreme viewpoints as presented in speeches, 
interviews and official documents, but also according to Payne’s typological 
description and Griffin’s later generic definition of fascism. However, two of the main 
features of fascism as well as the extreme right are revolution and anti-democracy. I 
do not think these features fully apply to the case of XA. 
 
Though anti-democracy can be defined in many ways, the simplest definition is that 
one opposes the ruling system. In that way, anti-democracy and revolution are highly 
related concepts. Nevertheless, it is possible to be anti-democratic without wanting a 
revolution. XA also explicitly says that they wish to overthrow the existing 
government. However, though XA both in their ideological documents, such as the 
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Programme and the Manifesto, as well as in verbal statements from their main leaders 
and members of parliament, are unsparing in their critique of the ruling politicians 
during the Metapolitefsi, they are not extreme in the sense that they seem to want to 
oust the government by force. Instead they emphasise that ‘Golden Dawn's objective 
is to overthrow the corrupt governance system of the Metapolitefsi era, through the 
democratic procedure’ by obtaining ‘[an] absolute majority in the Parliament.’302 
 
My discussion on the difference between the radical and the extreme (Chapter 2) 
should be kept in mind here. Anti-democracy and revolutionary ideas are one of the 
main differences between the radical and the extreme. Arguably, it is easier to ban an 
extreme party than a more moderate radical party, since only the former is a real threat 
to existing society and the political system. The fact that XA uses milder formulations 
in their ideological documents than in their rhetoric could therefore be interpreted as a 
tactical approach. Even so, it could be beneficial to distinguish between the party and 
the movement. The party is clearly defined through the Manifesto and the 
Programme, and the movement is defined by XA’s actions and the rhetoric used by 
the leaders. And so I have established that XA in general can be seen as nationalist, 
fascist and populist, but is it extreme as well? This is where the division is important.  
 
The question is not whether or not the party can be considered as belonging to the far 
right, but whether or not it can be categorised as extreme. Consequently, I place 
Golden Dawn as a party within Anders Widfeldt’s group 4 (see Chapter 2) and 
categorise it as a ‘neo-populist radical right-wing party’. It is neo-populist due to its 
pursuit and use of the volonté general, as defined by Cas Mudde. It is radical and not 
extreme due to its ideological core, and the documents citing the wish for a peaceful 
revolution through the existing system. Even so, I argue that the movement should be 
categorised as belonging to the extreme right, not only due to the use of violence 
displayed by prominent party members, but also due to the frequent xenophobic 
references evidenced in their ideological documents. 
                                            
302 Golden Dawn International Newsroom, ‘The Program of the Golden Dawn’, my emphasis. 
110 
  
 
As I have demonstrated, fascism is a central component of extreme right movements. 
This is also relevant in the case of Golden Dawn. However, XA is also illustrative of 
the relation between nationalism, National Socialism and fascism, and so I argue that 
nationalism, often through a national socialist interpretation, is the foundation for XA 
as a fascist extreme right movement. The question that remains to be answered, then, 
is whether or not the case of Golden Dawn is a general case, i.e., can it demonstrate 
something beyond the case at hand? 
 
Beyond the Greek borders: What can we learn from the case of Golden 
Dawn? 
In Chapter 1 I briefly introduced a study done by de Bromhead et al. on the growth of 
political extremism in Germany in the late 1920s and 1930s. They isolated the 
explanations into five broad categories, namely economic factors, social cleavages, 
external influence, electoral systems and institutional/cultural inheritances. I argue 
that these explanations are applicable in the case of extremism in Greece as well, 
thereby strengthening the generalisability of the study done by de Bromhead et al. I 
will shortly elaborate.  
 
The economy is an integrated part of any modern society, and it is therefore highly 
vulnerable to external influences. In the case of Greece, the integration with the 
common market and the euro area made it impossible for the country to devalue its 
currency when the financial crisis struck. The admission, in 2004, of having ‘fudged’ 
the convergence criteria further deepened the crisis in an already unstable economy. 
The crisis must also be seen in the context of a tradition of corruption and clientelism 
that had existed both prior to and throughout the Metapolitefsi era, which calls to mind 
the fifth point of de Bromhead et al. As for the second explanation I have argued that 
cleavages have been an important part in shaping Greek politics and society, 
especially in the 20th century. I have often referred to these cleavages as political 
cleavages, though they have at times been socially or religiously motivated.  
111 
  
 
There has been a custom to use the electoral system in Greece to the advantage of the 
sitting parties in government. Though the system in itself has not been used to benefit 
the far right per se, it has instead been common to abolish it altogether and establish 
dictatorships, such as in the case of the 4th of August regime and the military Junta. As 
for external influence, this has been the case both now and in the past. As a curiosity, 
it may be worth mentioning that in most cases of political turmoil in Greece, external 
forces have interfered. This was the case during the establishment of the first kingdom 
in the 1820s, the regime of Metaxas in the late 1930s, the civil war in the late 1940s, 
as well as after the Junta and the inclusion of Greece in the EU in 1981. In conclusion, 
all five categories can also be found in the case of recent far right mobilisation in 
Greece, thereby strengthening my argument that the financial crisis might in fact have 
been the precipitating cause for the rise of Golden Dawn.  
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8 Conclusion 
 
To see whether or not the financial crisis may have been the precipitating cause for the 
rise in support for Golden Dawn, one needs to understand Greece both in the past and 
in the present. One needs to understand the condition of Greece at the time of the 
crisis, and how such events may have influenced the opinion of the populace. In this 
thesis my argument stretches from 1821 until today. This is a long period of time, and 
I have not covered every single event in this period. Instead I have tried to focus on 
politics and especially the elections. Election results may give a lot of information on 
people’s opinions, and of their anxieties, especially at times of crisis. And modern 
Greece has seen many crises. From the War of Independence and the unstable years of 
nation-building that followed, through the 4th of August regime of the 1930s, the civil 
war of the early 1950s and the regime of the Junta between 1967 and 1974, and up to 
the latest crisis, the financial crisis. The latest is set in a time at which the increase in 
the inflow of immigrants has, according to some, taken its toll on an unbalanced and 
unstable economy – at time when a single Greek farmer on Lesvos seems insignificant 
amidst the whole system that is the European Union.  
 
My account of the history of modern Greece has shown that there is a Greek tradition 
of leaning on far right parties at times of crisis. Now, an increase in unemployment 
has seen a rise in the support for extreme parties both to the left and to the right, 
especially amongst the younger population. The far right is again an alternative to the 
existing political system and the regime of the left and centrist parties. As the financial 
crisis progressed, the EU seemed hesitant to come to Greece’s rescue, and people took 
to the streets in large demonstrations. Most of the time, the riots were peaceful, but 
some featured groups of unemployed men questioning the authority of the police, with 
violent results. Suicide rates and unemployment rates increased as the crisis 
continued, and so did the support for the far right parties. 
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‘Has Greece’s economy finally turned a corner?’ asked the BBC on the 11th of 
December 2013.303 If they are correct and I am correct, my thesis will have shown that 
support for Golden Dawn will drop; however, it is unlikely that politics will again be 
balanced between ND and PASOK. Political cleavages linger for a long time in 
Greece, and discontentment with the existing political system does not disappear over 
the night. Nevertheless, the developments in Greek politics since the turn of the new 
millennium does suggest a wish for change that should not easily be brushed aside. 
Neither should the sudden blossoming in support for the far left party SYRIZA.  
 
As both local and European elections approach, the far right is mobilising across 
Europe, and it will be interesting to see whether the imprisoned Michaloliakos will 
retain his seat on the Athens city council, and whether the far right in Greece will keep 
their two members of the European Parliament, either through LAOS or XA. 
 
Greece is a country of extremes. The project of nation building, the Megali Idea, and 
the deep cleavages between royalists and republicans, and later communists and the 
far right created a sentiment given to political extremes – at either end of the spectrum 
– that is still present today. As a country of extremes, it rarely manages to stabilise 
something in between, instead creating systems of extreme opposites. It may therefore 
seem fitting (or frightening) that the Greek national motto is ‘Ελευθερία ή Θάνατος’ 
(Elefthería í thánatos), ‘liberty or death’. 
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1
Our identity 
 
Golden Dawn is a Social and Nationalist 
movement with a structure, principles and 
positions. It has been active in the political life of 
the country since the mid-90s, having taken part 
in EU elections (1994, 2009) and national 
elections (1996, 2009). On November 7, 2010 the 
Golden Dawn participated in the municipal 
elections. In the recent elections of June 17, 2012 
it received 7% and elected 18 MPs. 
 
The Social Nationalist movement of Golden 
Dawn is at the front line of the struggle against 
the suicidal memorandum and the sinful regime 
of the Parties that form the political 
establishment. We fight against the alteration of 
our racial demographics that is conducted by the 
millions of illegal immigrants, and the 
dissolution of the Greek society promoted by 
both the governing parties and the so-called Left. 
We propose a national strategy so that we can 
overcome the crisis imposed on our country. We 
are struggling for a Greece that belongs to the 
Greeks. 
 
WHAT BEING A GOLDEN DAWNER 
MEANS 
      1) I embrace the Third Great Ideology of 
history, the one that is rooted deeply in the 
history of my people. Opposed to both 
internationalist communism and globalist 
capitalism. 
     2) I embrace the need for a state founded and 
built based on this ideology that nourishes and 
guides continuously our lives as individuals and 
as a society. A state that constantly serves the 
eternal revolutionary principles of the Nationalist 
Worldview, with the ultimate goal of forming a 
new society and a new type of man.  
2
      3) I embrace the moral imperatives arising 
from my worldview and aim to a radical renewal 
of the obsolete and counterfeit social values. My 
ideology is not looking to salvage anything from 
the current economic and social interests that 
lead nations, peoples and cultures in decline. So 
I’m an enemy of every power that spreads this 
disease that finds foothold in the Plutocracy. 
Whether this power is a military-financial 
dictatorship or a parliamentary dictatorship. 
Because those are the two sides of the same coin, 
and their purpose is to tear down national 
identity. 
       4) I am aware that nationalism is the only 
absolute and true revolution because it seeks the 
birth of new moral, spiritual, social and mental 
values. The Right and Left solutions supposedly 
fighting each other, is just an illusion created by 
the two partners that perpetuate the dominance of 
cosmopolitan internationalists, anti-national and 
anti-social forces. 
      5) I believe the only state that serves correctly 
it’s historical role is the Social state, where 
political power comes from the people, without 
party promoters. Nationalism sees people not 
only as a numerical entity of individuals but as a 
qualitative synthesis of people with the same 
biological and spiritual heritage, which is the 
source of all creation and expresses its power in 
the social state. The only state that can represent 
the people as an organic and spiritual living 
entity. 
      6) The politicians on both the Right and the 
Left are deliberately lying, because democracy 
means "rule of the People", of the society that is 
comprised by people of common origin ( the 
definition of the Citizen in Classical Athens). The 
Social State of Nationalism is the only direct 
democracy. The state where the people are the 
only reality and do not need authority but 
leadership. The People are the real sovereign and 
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rule themselves through their leader. So the 
social state can fulfill the only possible equality 
(that derived from Human Thought and that is 
not a natural, but a human cultural–political 
creation), the equality of opportunities. In 
contrast to the transient and fleeting majority of 
parliamentary governing, the will of the people is 
the supreme law, and obedience to it results in 
true justice.... 
      7) I realize that in the Social State of the 
Nationalist Ideology , ultimate equality before 
the law and politically structured social equality 
exist. In the Social State there is no social 
stratification based on income or economic 
classes. The social classes are organically 
collaborating groups of people with different 
abilities and productive skills each, just like in a 
living organism. The different systems contribute 
harmonically and in full cooperation for their 
survival. Solidarity is the rule of the Social State 
for the relations between social classes. The few 
people who have burgled their organic 
relationship with the people are the members of 
the Plutocratic Oligarchy with their 
cosmopolitanism, and members of the leading 
groups of “Bolshevik partisanship-unionist 
oligarchy” with their internationalism. The 
oligarchies of money and the political parties are 
all the same- enemies of the Nation and the 
People. 
      8) I am an enemy of the vast and exploitative 
Capital, either local or international, and a 
champion of small family ownership like the 
“kleros” or “temenos” of our ancestors. Money is 
a mean of necessity, not a governing principle of 
life or the purpose of it. The ultimate goal of the 
Social State is the elimination of the false value 
of money and the controlled use of it as a trading 
mean. The State should have control over private 
property so that it won't be abused and won't 
endanger the survival of the People. The 
economy should be planned to serve the National 
policy and to ensure maximum self-sufficiency 
without dependence on international markets and 
the control of multinational corporations. 
      9) I believe that the state, the Social State, is 
the political expression of the nation and that the 
nation sprouts from itself, without it being an 
invention. It is an automatic spiritual event that 
springs from the existence of the People, it is a 
reality that is based on the existence of the 
People. Whether or not the People realize the 
extent and depth of its existence, the Nation is the 
highest spiritual entity. The People is born from 
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the Race, and its existence gives birth to the 
Nation as a superior spiritual manifestation 
(moral, cultural, religious). Derived from the 
people, the Nation – Race, needs to be 
strengthened and developed through the state. It 
may exist without a state but will be steadily 
declining (See the national rise of the Greeks 
after 4 centuries of subjugation and the lack of a 
state). So I understand that international 
communism and liberal cosmopolitanism are 
undermining the nation by stirring up class 
divisions. 
      10) I believe in the importance of the society, 
the community of the People, and not that of the 
individual. The individual becomes a person and 
forms his shape, his “I” identity within the “We” 
of the total. Individuals do not have historical 
significance as opposed to the People who are 
space-time condensations of qualities of the 
People and the Nation. An individual can become 
a person when he socially integrates himself, 
through his ability, as the harmonious 
composition of social and individual values. This 
superior type of human is the new kind of human 
that nationalism seeks to create. 
      11) I honor and respect my tradition because 
it is the sum of beauty and the goodness that 
occurred and revealed in my People's history. 
While bound by tradition, I seek the new 
creation, the incessant evolution. 
      12) The Social State of Nationalism delivers 
social equality of opportunities based in 
meritocracy and does not ignore the Natural law 
of diversity and difference. Respecting the 
spiritual, ethnic and racial differences of men we 
can build a society of social justice and equality 
before the law. This equality is the proof of the 
moral transgression of nationalism and shows 
that there is no legal modulation to protect the 
naturally existing inequalities that are an integral 
part of nature and life. On the contrary, the 
Social–National State gives the same 
opportunities of enhancement and conservation 
to everyone of the different elements of every 
existence. So, as a Nationalist, I fight all forms of 
destructive "equalizing" policies (of Nations, 
Races, Men), and any false artificial inequalities 
and oligarchies (Money, Political Parties, 
Perversions). 
 
ARISTOCRACY IS BORN OUT OF 
MERITOCRACY, THIS IS WHY I FIGHT 
AGAINST ALL FORMS OF OLIGARCHY 
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